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ABSTRACT
BEYOND BRANCH: AN EXAMINATION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
AND CONSCRIPTION POLICIES

Victoria Bryant Stewart, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2018
J. Mitchell Pickerill, J.D., Ph.D.

Despite its unpopularity when used during the American Civil War, conscription was
used during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Conscription,
mandatory military service, required America’s male population to be registered and serve the
nation. These men, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, fought in these declared and
undeclared wars. Conscription laws lapsed, which drastically reduced the size of the military.
Members of Congress enacted legislation to initiate new conscription calls to serve the military
needs of the nation. President Abraham Lincoln, President Woodrow Wilson, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, President Harry S. Truman, President Lyndon Baines Johnson were president
when conscription bills were passed by the Congress. Each of these presidents signed the bills
into law. While the presidents had not taken an active role regarding the passage of the bill, the
bills were signed into law.
This project examines the role of the presidents as they delivered proclamations or issued
executive orders regarding conscription. Some presidents, however, have been noticeable silent
during their terms in office. Presidents verbally encouraged compliance among eligible men and
other Americans. These statements often contained strong language that linked compliance to
patriotism and a requirement of duty. Other presidents made statements that addressed the
fairness of the system while they expressed their intent to improve conscription. Presidents also

made statements related to clemency or pardoning of violators. These sources expose the role of
the American presidency to elicit support for conscription or empathy for violators. Conscription
is an interesting case study to examine amid the theories of critical juncture, path dependency,
power of the president, unilateral action, and the Two Presidencies Thesis. In a departure with
the militia system, the implementation of federal conscription signifies a critical juncture. In
creating this new system, Congress passed legislation to directly conscript men into the United
States military. The theories of unilateral action should not be broadly used to explain the
actions of all presidents at the time of an active draft. There are, however, few instances in
which presidents took unilateral action in regard to conscription. Presidents have followed the
action of Congress to draft and pass bills regarding conscription. The Two Presidencies Thesis
has been used to explain the deference of Congress to presidents in matters of foreign policy, but
conscription remains an example of Congress leading the action. While there are some noted
exceptions (such as President Richard Nixon, President Gerald Ford, and President James
Carter), presidents have mostly followed Congress rather than take an outward stance regarding
conscription.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2018

BEYOND BRANCH: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY AND
CONSCRIPTION POLICIES

BY
VICTORIA BRYANT STEWART
© 2018 Victoria Bryant Stewart

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Thesis Director:
J. Mitchell Pickerill, J.D., Ph.D.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I greatly appreciate the time, wealth of knowledge, and assistance of my committee
throughout this process. I extend deep appreciation to Dr. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Dr. Scot
Schraufnagel, and Dr. Andrea Radasanu. Kim Wilson was an incredible resource through this
process. I have been fortunate to have many friends and colleagues that have been invaluable in
their continued support for my academic study. Robert Glover, Julia Mackert, and Rick Pierson
encouraged me and have provided rich insight as I wrote this thesis. I had the honor of teaching
American Government and American History to many incredible students through this process.
They have asked for status updates and have brought a smile to my face after a long day. They
bring much joy to my life. I greatly appreciate the support of Dr. James Schmidt, Dr. Helen
Nagata, and Dr. Valerie Morkevicius for their letters of recommendation that helped in my
admission into this Master’s program. Tim Madsen has served as my editor, chef, tutor, test
audience, and soundboard. You really have been the unsung hero in this process, but please
know that your contributions and support have not gone unnoticed or unappreciated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………………………………………… iv
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………….1
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ……………………………………………………………6
Conscription ……………………………………………………………………...6
American Presidents ……………………………………………………………..10
Presidents Going Public ………………………………………………………….11
Image and Public Perception ………………………………………………….….13
Unilateral Action …………………………………………………………………14
Two Presidencies Thesis …………………………………………………………18
THEORY AND DISCUSSION….………………………………………………...……..25
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND CONSCRIPTION: CASE STUDIES..………….42
American Civil War ………………………………………………………………42
World War I ………………………………………………………………….…...48
World War II ………………………………………………………………….…..55
Korean War …………………………………………………………………….…64
Vietnam War ……………………………………………………………………...73
The End of the Draft and All Volunteer Force …………………………………...81
UNDERSTANDING THE DATA.……………………………………………………….92
CONCLUSION..………………………………………………………………………….95
BIBLIOGRAPHY.………………………………………………………………………..98

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Congressional Voting Patterns…………………………………..…………… 92
Table 2: Presidential Congressional Support …………………………………....…….93

INTRODUCTION
Conscription, the requirement of mandatory military service, was used during different
periods of American history.1 At various times, between 1863 and 1973, conscription quickly
amassed a large military. This study exposes the changes during this timeframe as an
exploration of the actions by Congress as it emphasizes the role of the president. While
conscription remained unpopular following its use during the American Civil War, conscription
remained as a consistent military policy during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and
the Vietnam War. Following American involvement in a conflict, the United States military
reduced in size. Conscription was then regularly used to quickly muster, train, and assemble men
for military service in periods of declared war, undeclared war, and during times of peace. The
president and Congress share distinct powers regarding the military. These branches, as
demonstrated, serve distinct roles regarding conscription. In following the precedent set during
the American Civil War, the Congress continued to pass conscription legislation and the
president signed these bills into law. Presidents followed these actions of Congress as they
refrained from active involvement of the passage of these bills. Additionally, they did not issue
proclamations or executive orders until after the bills passed in the Congress. With the
exceptions of President Richard Nixon’s call to end conscription and President James Carter’s
call to reinstate registration, presidents mainly followed the Congress. When they issued

1

Conscription is defined as mandatory military service in the United States military between 1863 and 1973. It is
more commonly, and recently, referred to as “the draft.” For the sake of formality and consistency, the term
“conscription” will be used throughout this text.
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proclamations and executive orders, they pled for compliance and highlighted punishments for
disobedience.
Before the use of federal conscription, the states’ militias were deployed and federalized
for both defensive and offensive purposes. The earliest use of the states’ militia, before the
American Civil War and the advent of federal conscription, rested with the Congress. The United
States Constitution details the use of state militia forces within Article I and II since the
legislative and executive branches have been given different duties and responsibilities over the
militia forces. These different duties range from the summoning of troops, creation of laws
regarding militia forces, and being the commander in chief of militia forces. Congress, as noted
in Article I, Section 8, have the authority to declare war and raise armies for the defense of the
United States. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the right “to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”2 Article 1,
Section 8 further provides the Congress the power “to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”3
The president, therefore, has been given different duties regarding militia forces. The
raising, arming, and training of the states’ militias, as detailed in Article I, Section 8, is vested
with the powers of the Congress. Once troops enlist into the military, the president then controls
these troops according to the powers provided to the president. The president, according to
Article II, Section 2, “shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
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U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8.
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8.
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and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.”4
The military represents an interesting case to examine since these two branches have distinct
responsibilities regarding the military. These separate duties and responsibilities, having been
created as a form of checks and balances, separate these distinct duties over the military. Before
the American Civil War, these separate duties fostered a further delay before troops could be
used in the absence of a formal declaration to federalize troops or in advance of a formal
declaration of war.5
Conscription laws lapsed following a war’s conclusion or within a given period as
designated by Congress. Decades after the conclusion of the American Civil War, as tensions
mounted and President Woodrow Wilson weighed the cost of intervention into World War I, the
Congress voted upon the Selective Service Act. This act bore similarities to the American Civil
War’s Enrollment Act. Republican Representative Julius Kahn introduced the Selective Service
Act to implement a conscription call. President Wilson supported the measure, and signed the
bill into law on May 18, 1917. This act, altered based upon suggestions from the organizer of the
Union’s conscription law as used during the American Civil War, created a new system of
mandatory military service. One significant change to conscription was self-registration since it
placed the responsibility directly upon males to register and comply with the new law.
Following this conflict, much like the end of the American Civil War, the conscription law
expired. Decades later, as American government leaders watched Europe erupt into another

4

U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 2.
Lois G. Schwoerer (1974) detailed the reasons for these distinctions and the use of militia forces. In this view, the
framers were aware of the British militia tradition and the Militia Ordinance. The Militia Ordinance in Great Britain
separated the powers of militia use between the sovereign and Parliament. Schwoerer explains, “The idea that the
legislature rather than the executive should have ultimate control over the armed force of the nation became a central
element in all future arguments” (Schwoerer 1974, 50).
5
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conflict, Democratic Senator Edward Burke and Republican Senator James Wadsworth
introduced the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. President Franklin Roosevelt ushered
in a significant change when he signed America’s first peacetime conscription law in September
1940. This conscription law was then used to muster men into service once the United States
officially entered World War II on December 8, 1941. Unlike earlier periods, registration and a
peacetime draft became a standard practice.
New conscription laws were passed in 1948 and 1967. Years following World War II’s
conclusion, Republican Senator Robert Taft and Republican Senator Charles Elston introduced
the Military Service Act (also called the Selective Service Act of 1948). This act increased the
size of the standing military in the United States following the post-war demobilization. The
Military Service Act also created a system of reserves. President Harry Truman signed the bill
into law on June 24, 1948. Decades later, with the pending expiration of Selective Service in
1967, Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democratic Senator Joseph S. Clark, and
General Mark W. Clark proposed amendments and an extension of conscription. President
Lyndon Johnson signed this law on June 30, 1967. Each time the law became more clear and
explicit to detail the selected men that were eligible for deferments as deferments were also
changed and altered during this period.6 President Richard Nixon, a supporter of the All
Volunteer Force, ushered in a significant change with the lottery system in 1969. Fairness,
always a contentious aspect of conscription law, became paramount for legislators. Despite his
call to end conscription, Nixon called for the Congress to extend conscription for two years when

6

Deferments served as a means to determine the eligibility of men for service. Deferments were available for the
men that worked in certain industries, for those with health issues or ailments, those with dependents, and for
college students (either undergraduate or graduate).
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it expired in 1971. The active draft ended in 1973, with the expiration of the extension during
Nixon’s presidency, and President Gerald Ford ended registration in 1975. This end to
registration was short-lived, however, since President James Carter called to resume registration
in 1980 following the Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan.
Conscription was implemented as a satisfactory means of manpower procurement, and
these two branches of government had different roles in protecting this government policy. The
growth and power of the federal state (since the American Civil War) also influenced the
acceptance of conscription among members of both political parties. In various periods of
American history, the Congress implemented new laws regarding conscription while the
presidents signed these bills. These branches, given separate powers within the Constitution,
served different roles regarding conscription.
Throughout its use in American history, presidents have given proclamations or issued
executive orders regarding conscription. Some presidents, however, have been noticeably silent
during their terms in office. Presidents made statements to plea for compliance among eligible
men and other Americans. These statements often contain strong language that linked
compliance to patriotism and duty. Other presidents made statements regarding the fairness of
the system while they expressed their efforts to improve conscription. Presidents also made
statements related to clemency or intended pardon of violators. The scope of proclamations and
executive orders range based upon the period and in relation to the American public’s attitudes
regarding conscription or violations. These sources expose the role of the American presidency
to elicit support for conscription or even empathy for violators.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Scholars focus upon many important issues related to the use of conscription and the
actions of presidents. These scholars touch upon the changes in American society following the
implementation of a federal form of conscription, efforts to instill obedience to conscription, and
support of conscription over time in the United States. These studies provide rich insight to the
consequences to this shift in American military policy while it also exposes the efforts to ensure
adherence to the new law. Other bodies of literature address the role of the president, the reasons
for their course of action, and the tools of the presidency. This literature illustrates the role of the
president to offer support for policies, their ability to use tools to work with other branches of
government, and even their power to act unilaterally. This literature further exposes the
importance of the president within the federal government when assessing factors of public
opinion, image, and popularity. This literature further shows the importance of individual
presidents, the given time period under examination, the president’s role amid foreign policy,
and the purposeful efforts to engage with the American public for support.
Conscription
Literature regarding the operation of conscription is limited. This literature addresses
several main themes. This literature focuses upon changes in society following the
implementation of conscription, efforts to silence dissent against conscription, decline of support
for conscription when used for foreign wars, and the government’s response once conscription
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was implemented through history. In total, these scholars focus on the consequences of this new
military policy upon the American public and efforts by government leaders as this military
policy remained an unpopular military policy. While most of these pieces of scholarship is
period specific to a single American conflict, it does expose overarching issues over a period of
time.
Eugene Murdock (1971) contributes the most comprehensive account of conscription
during the American Civil War, but Murdock’s work focuses upon those that resisted against
conscription rather than address the federal government’s actions to implement and uphold this
military policy. Margaret Levi (1997) addresses the changes upon and within American society
after the introduction of conscription since this policy created a new sense of service to the state.
As Levi shows, the acceptance of conscription among the American populace is reliant among
men understanding they have a requirement of service. In a similar study, Ralph Young (2008)
addresses the American government’s efforts to use propaganda as a means to convince
Americans of the necessity of conscription. Like Levi, Young also addresses this changing
understanding of the responsibility and requirement of service to the state. Timothy Perri (2013)
surveys American history to describe the periods when conscription was used to note similarities
among different periods since the use of conscription shows changes in American society to
require male citizens to serve the federal state (Perri 2013, 437).
Scholars also address the consequences of implementing conscription. Allan R. Millett
and Peter Maslowski (2012) survey American history from before the American Revolution to
the present day to show the ramifications of conscription since conscription caused divisions
within American society (Millett and Maslowski 2012, 82). In a similar approach, Richard
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Leone and Greg Anrig (2003) highlight factions within American society to expose the interplay
of work among the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), the CIA (Central Intelligence
Agency), United States military, and local police forces to change and inform American attitudes
regarding mandatory military service. These studies provide insight into American society as
they expose fundamental changes to American attitudes regarding military service and service to
the federal state. In a related and relevant study, Antonis Adam (2012) evaluates the ways that
“unstable democratic institutions employ military conscription as a mechanism to control the
military and to prevent its involvement in a successful coup” (Adam 2012, 715). While this
study is outside of the United States, it illustrates other intentional uses of conscription and the
efforts to inform military policy as a method of control.
Other scholars address the silence of dissent of anti-conscription protest. Robert E.
Cushman (1956) notes the limitations placed upon anti-war or anti-conscription speech since
these restrictions did not abruptly end once the conflict ended. Peter Irons (2000) focuses upon
the language of the United States Constitution to examine First Amendment protections and
restricted during times of war. Irons questions if the First Amendment was intended to be
limited during times of war and national emergency. Joan Jevsen (1999) focuses on instances of
dissent between the American Revolution and 1980. Those opposed to war, according to Jevsen,
became targets since they were viewed as enemies against the state as an “internal enemy”
(Jevsen 1999, 179). Nancy Ford (2002) and Aryeh Neiser (20003) argue that World War I posed
the greatest threat for anti-war activists. Michael Linfield (1990) notes, the Vietnam War era
ushered in support for outspoken dissent that challenged the status quo. According to Linfield,
speech was accepted if it “connected with the civil rights movement” rather than posed a threat
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against American involvement in the Vietnam War (Linfield 1990, 153). This literature relates
to the previous discussion of changes among American society to accept mandatory military
service. Despite the efforts to reinforce service to the state, people resistance against this policy.
This literature regarding resistance exposes resistance to accept conscription, but it also
highlights similar activities across different American conflicts.
Other literature addresses the support of foreign policy issues and support of conscription
when used for foreign wars. Michael Horowitz and Matthew Levendusky (2011) show that
support for foreign conflicts declines when conscription is used to amass the fighting forces.
According to Jack Citrin, Ernst Haas, Christopher Muste, and Beth Reingold (1994), the
Vietnam War represents a period of declining support of foreign policy, an objection to
conscription, and a time of questioning of the legitimacy of the American government (Citrin,
Haas, Muste, and Reingold 1994, 3). Sunil Kumar Sahu (1976) describes the relief among
American men at the end of conscription and the Vietnam War (Sahu 1976, 393). These studies
illustrate many issues when using conscription for large scale and foreign wars. In these cases,
foreign policies were questioned and conscription was not supported when used for foreign
policies. While other studies show the efforts to instill a sense of service to the state, the use of
conscription for foreign policies remained contested in the United States. As Sahu notes, there
was a sense of relief only once conscription calls ended in the United States. These studies show
the decline of support of conscription when used in foreign wars.
Another set of literature addresses the government’s response. In focusing on the United
States Justice Department, Geoffrey Stone (2004) explains how this department used
prosecutions as a method to deter others from engaging in anti-war or anti-conscription activities.
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Daniel Farber (2008) focuses on government leadership, especially President Lyndon Johnson
and President Richard Nixon, as he shows how neither president was concerned with prosecuting
resisters for libel (Farber 2008, 98). In a related study, Nan Levinson (2003) focuses on the
government’s intentions to censor any speech that was opposed to the war since it was
“dangerous,” but rather the government was focused on “[keeping] information secret”
(Levinson 2003, 9). These studies expose the response by the United States government to make
decisions to protect conscription or deal with dissent. As shown by these scholars, a consistent
policy to deal with dissent had not been created. Most of the attention was focused on keeping
confidential information as classified rather than implement broad efforts of punishment.
Despite the resistance to conscription, most of those that resisted were not punished for their
efforts. Most of those punished were leaders of the anti-war movement during the Vietnam War,
but punishments were not broad and sweeping to punish all instances of disobedience.
American Presidents
Scholars focus upon the American presidency in order to understand the actions and role
of presidents in the United States. Presidents serve a vital role within the government of the
United States. Scholars examine individual presidents, but also assess the powers of the
presidency. This literature, in total, addresses key points of examination to determine the ways
presidents persuade, influence, inform, and act unilaterally. This body of literature captures the
rationale of presidents as they calculate their actions within a given situation. Scholars have
taken notice of these calculated moves by presidents since these actions further reflect the
successes of certain presidents. Presidents have certain tools at their disposal, which include
going public, their focus on their image and public perception, unilateral action, and their
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interaction with the Congress upon issues of foreign policy. These particular cases expose the
complexity of the actions and role of the president regarding policy formation, the
implementation of policy, and the progression of policy.
Presidents Going Public
Presidents, in addition to using bargaining and persuasion, use the method of going
public. This method allows the president to introduce policies to the American people as a
means to gain support. George Edwards III (2003) explains how the support of the public is a
“critical resource” of presidents since it serves as a “central strategy for governing” (Edwards
2003, 8). Public support, according to Edwards, marks the success of presidents since failure to
obtain this support “is a failure of leadership for which [presidents] should be held accountable”
(Edwards 2003, 7). Edwards describes the concept of a permanent campaign, first used by
Richard Nixon, that serves as an extension of the presidential campaign to seek approval by the
American public through utilizing a constant campaign (Edwards 2003, 4). Edwards compares
and contrasts President Ronald Reagan and President William Clinton. President Clinton “was
frustrated in his efforts to move public opinion” while President Reagan became president during
“a compatible wave of public opinion, and he effectively exploited the opportunity the voters
handed him” (Edwards 2003, 34-35 and 72). Going Public, for Samuel Kernell (2007), is a tactic
better used in modern times as it highlights the successes of presidents to have influence.
Approval, for Kernell, is measured by support of presidents and support for their policies since
this support is often given after careful, calculated steps by the president to ensure this support
(Kernell 2007, ix).
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Brandon Rottinghaus (2006) argues, “I find no differences in congruent position taking
between presidents who served earlier (Eisenhower to Ford) for those who served later (Carter to
Clinton)” since “the election effect discovered in the president’s first term is repeated in the
second term in advance of midterm or presidential elections” (Rottinghaus 2006, 720). He
explains that “presidents are found to be more likely to make congruent statements when their
popularity is above average and less likely to make congruent statements when their popularity is
lower” while they “use the momentum of their reelection (and higher popularity) to continue to
involve the public in their policies” (Rottinghaus 2006, 729-730). In uncovering this presidential
activity, presidents become “support-maximizing agents” instead of “vote-maximizing agents”
(Rottinghaus 2006, 729). Efforts to secure high levels of popularity become a means for the
president to gain party support. This support, for example, could ensure the election of future
candidate from within the president’s party. Like Edwards, Rottinghaus cites the permanent
campaign in which presidents employ tactics that include “media strategies, even staging,
speechmaking, and domestic and international travel” (Rottinghaus 2006, 729). These efforts are
used to secure public support for the president and their policies. These efforts show strategic
choices by presidents to engage with the public, but also illustrate their efforts to secure their
future in politics. Obtaining this support, as Rottinghaus and Edwards note, are dependent on
certain conditions and employ assorted tactics to further support for their agendas.
B. Dan Wood, Chris Owens, and Brandy Durham (2005) evaluate the president’s public
statements and their impact on American attitudes and the economy. Wood, Owens, and
Durham explain the American public’s expectations to ensure a stable, strong economy. In
addition to the logistical tools of the president to “affect the cost of producer-consumer
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exchanges through regulatory policy” or “through nominations to the Federal Reserve Board,”
presidents use speeches as “a powerful instrument of economic leadership that can affect
consumer perceptions of current and future economic conditions” (Wood, Owens, and Durham
2005, 642). Positive remarks bring positive results since “presidential rhetoric can have an
indirect, but substantial effect on macroeconomic outcomes” (Wood, Owens, and Durham 2005,
643). Similarly to Rottinghaus, this study of presidential rhetoric addresses those “presidents
who seek reelection and approval” since there is a need for presidents to “[maintain] credible
rhetorical leadership” (Wood, Owens, and Durham 2005, 643). These efforts of addressing the
economy may allow the president to take a position on an on-going issue and claim issue
ownership. By solidifying the public’s support through positive comments and rhetoric, the
president can successfully influence the public’s perception of the strength of the economy while
attempting to secure their support for any policies regarding the economy. These studies expose
the main advantages for presidents to go public. As these studies show, presidents bring support
and confidence through this tactic.
Image and Public Perception
Scholars also assess the role of image shaping and public perception upon the actions of
presidents. Gregory McAvoy (2008) seeks to explain the “public character” of presidents as it
relates to their approval rating (McAvoy 2008, 284). He evaluates the presidents in the “image is
everything” period to understand the likeability of presidents (McAvoy 2008, 284). Presidents
are also evaluated based upon their judgement, decision making, and actions. Brandice CanesWrone and Keeneth Shotts (2004) address a related concept, which consists of the effects of
public opinion or support of a president’s policy based upon their decision making. Public
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support for a popular cause is difficult since presidents risk catering toward popular causes that
may not be appropriate for the long term benefit of the nation (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004,
695). McAvoy, Canes-Wrone and Shotts all address the importance of the president (and
presidential actions) as a response or appeasement toward public opinion. They note the need to
shape a president’s image, but also address the president’s actions as a response to this perceived
popularity or unpopularity. According to the findings of Canes-Wrone and Shotts, similar to the
work of Rottinghaus, presidents “are more likely to endorse popular policies in the second half of
the term” (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004, 702). These studies expose the complex issues of
shaping the image and public perception of presidents within a given period or during a
particular part of their tenure in office. Adhering or providing support for causes bears risks
given the nature of the cause, but presidents can gain support for themselves when publicly
supporting certain issues. These instances illustrate the ways in which presidents behave within
a given political climate and in conjunction with the attitudes of the American public.
Unilateral Action
Presidents may also utilize unilateral actions as a means to influence public policy.
Kenneth Mayer (2002) describes the ways the presidents use executive orders to utilize their
power. Existing literature focuses on the leadership and strategies of presidents rather than their
usage of executive orders. Presidents may appear weak since they are “hobbled by the
separation of powers and the short reach of his formal legal authority,” but power of presidents is
“far from being a matter of prerogative or legal rule” since presidents have the ability to persuade
(Mayer 2002, 4).7 Despite this power to persuade, “presidents have relied on their executive
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Mayer directly references the work of Neustadt. See, Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern
Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1960).
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authority to make unilateral policy without interference from either Congress or the courts”
(Mayer 2002, 4). Mayer addresses Richard Neustadt’s (1960) concept of bargaining since
executive orders can be placed into two categories. Executive orders are either “self-executing”
when they “do not lead to immediate action” or are a “bargaining tool” (Mayer 2002, 29-30).
When used as a “bargaining tool,” this closely mirrors Neustadt’s concept of persuasion (Mayer
2002, 31). In this case, presidents act on their own with little oversight of the other branches.
This action is persuasive in an effort for presidents to have influence in a different way since
their powers, in this given instance, extend to influence a public policy on their own terms.
William Howell (2003), in a similar study, highlights how executive orders are essential
tools for presidents as they relate to both foreign and domestic policy. He classifies executive
orders as either “preemption” or “act alone” based on their usage (Howell 2003, 15). In
employing unilateral action, presidents have the potential to be effective presidents. As Howell
notes, “when presidents unilaterally set policies that do not require any positive congressional
action, they enjoy tremendous discretion; non-action on the part of Congress and the courts is
functionally equivalent to support” (Howell 2003, xvii). In his critique of Neustadt (1960),
Howell notes the importance of the president’s actions regarding a policy while they wait for a
challenge from Congress or the courts. According to Howell, “scholars have lost sight of one of
the most important ways in which presidents influence public policy in the modern era: that is by
setting policy on their own, by acting unilaterally” (Howell 2003, 175). As these studies show,
unilateral action allows the presidents to drive the implementation of policy. If not faced with a
challenge from the other branches, presidents can successfully exercise their role in driving
policy.
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Presidents use presidential proclamations as another tool of unilateral action. Brandon
Rottinghaus and Jason Maier (2007), evaluating the time period of 1977 to 2005, illustrate the
use of proclamations as a “policy-making instrument” as it extends president’s “regulatory
power” (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007, 339).8 As with recess appointments, Rottinghaus and
Maier show how presidential proclamations work in tandem with other tools. According to
Rottinghaus and Maier, proclamations “are also not independent of larger policy or political
concerns” (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007, 342). Though unknown to the public, proclamations
“extend presidential power under a unilateral presidency” (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007, 342).9
Presidential proclamations grant “little control” for Congress since they “may not sanction the
specific policy implementation but [Congress] has largely ceded the authority to act on the issue
to the White House” (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007, 342). As they illustrate, the weakness of
Congress increases the usage of presidential proclamations since weakness in the Congress
minimizes a response to presidential action.
Presidents use signing statements as a “[strategy] employed to preserve executive
prerogatives and advance presidential policy in the face of gridlock” (Kelley and Marshall 2010,
168). In examining the usage of signing statements between 1981 and 2008, Christopher Kelley
and Bryan Marshall (2010) illustrate the “incentives” of their usage (Kelley and Marshall 2010,
168). According to Kelley and Marshall, their increased usage is a tactic to “challenge
legislation and/or assert constitutional powers” amid “unified government, major legislation, and

In Table 1, Rottinghaus and Maier illustrate the major categories of issues that include “trade, national parks, and
international agreements” (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007, 340).
9
See also, Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).
8
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election cycles” (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 169).10 Congressional opposition to signing
statements is less likely to occur if Congress is politically aligned with the president (Kelley and
Marshall 2010, 176). 11 Presidential approval ratings and election years also influence the usage
of signing statements. Signing statements “assist the president toward cementing powers and a
policy legacy” (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 177). Rhetorical signing statements are used “to
garner press attention or communicate to an important constituency” and constitutional signing
statements are used as a means to “enhance presidential power or control over policy” (Kelley
and Marshall 2010, 177). Signing statements are more likely to be used on major rather than
minor legislation since presidents are “strategic” by “wielding constitutional signing statements
on major legislation where the policy consequence and concern over interinstitutional
competition are the greatest” (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 184).12 As with the other studies
previously discussed, this serves as another example of presidential action as related to strategic
planning and effort. This further illustrates the relationship of the president with the Congress to
determine the positive motives to act unilaterally. In these cases, presidents purposefully act and
react as they factor key aspects of the given social context.
Louis Fisher (2014) reassesses the powers applied by presidents. Fisher notes how older
scholarship “urged presidents to act decisively and unilaterally, equating executive power with
the public good. The need to check and limit power was ignored or dismissed” (Fisher 2014,

Rhetorical signing statements “are intended to claim credit, reward important supporters or political
constituencies, and/or to cast a negative light on political opponents” (Kelley and Marshall, 2010, 173).
Constitutional signing statements “outline qualifications and/or challenges to certain section(s) of the bill that may
violate presidential power and principles of federalism/separation of powers, as well as civil liberties” (Kelley and
Marshall 2010, 174). Presidents “reinterpret vague or undefined language in the bill in a fashion that strengthens
executive prerogatives” (Kelley and Marshall, 2010, 174).
11
Periods of unified government increase the usage of constitutional signing statements (Kelley and Marshall, 2010,
184).
12
According to Kelley and Marshall, President George H. W. Bush is a unique case.
10
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164-165). Recent scholarship “systematically debunked” this older literature since new
scholarship seeks to “place executive power within the framework of the Constitution, law, and
checks and balances” (Fisher 2014, 167). Fisher’s findings expose overarching legal issues of
presidential action in policy making. These cases show how the presidents retain these powers
of unilateral action as they navigate policy decisions amid their interaction with the Congress.
Scholars disagree upon the advantages and disadvantages of the use of tools since
presidential success varies when using these tools. Neustadt (1960) stresses the importance of
bargaining and persuasion, but this tool has not been uniformly used by all presidents.
Presidents may choose to plea directly to the American people to gain support. They may further
utilize unilateral actions to bypass Congressional interference to their policies. These other tools
demonstrate how presidents have been successful without traditional bargaining or persuading.
Neustadt’s work shows how presidents have resorted to extreme action in certain situations.
Going public, for example, brings attention to issues. Despite the ability to employ this tactic,
presidents (such as President William Clinton) have struggled to effectively gain their desired
results. These cases illustrate the difficulty when using these tools since presidents deal with the
consequence when they fail to use the tools properly in a given situation.
Two Presidencies Thesis
According to Aaron Waldavsky (1966), “presidents had much greater success in
controlling the nation’s defense and foreign policies than in dominating domestic policies” since
“presidents are sometimes frustrated by congressional resistance and counteroffensive.”13 He
offered an explanation of this trend through his Two Presidencies Thesis. The thesis illustrates

See, Lee Sigelman, “A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis,” The Journal of Politics 41, no. 4
(November 1979): 1195. See, Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action IV (December 1966): 7.
13
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the instances when Congress defers to the president. Lee Sigelman (1979), in offering a
reevaluation of Waldavsky’s Two Presidencies Thesis, argues that “most presidents have not
enjoyed a freer hand in the foreign and defense arenas than in domestic policy-making”
(Sigelman 1979, 1203).14 Sigelman questioned the validity of this thesis upon earlier periods in
American history when Congress dominated foreign policy. For Sigelman, though, the
“presidential performance in both domestic and foreign and defense policy had slipped”
(Sigelman 1979, 1196).15 Sigelman argues “there has been only a slight differential in
congressional support on domestic as opposed to foreign and defense issues” (Sigelman 1979,
1201). President Gerald Ford and President James Carter represent exceptions, but presidents
were successful 88% on domestic issues among members of their party (Sigelman 1979, 1201).
When presidents deal with members of the opposing party, between 1957 and 1972, the
“opposition party was consistently more supportive of the President’s position on key foreign
and defense policy votes than on key votes pertaining to domestic matters” (Sigelman 1979,
1201). This “dramatic erosion of support” did not only influence foreign policy since
Congressional support of a president’s domestic policies “dwindled to a point even lower than
support for his domestic positions” (Sigelman 1979, 1203). Recent presidents have been unable
to secure 60% of key vote support (Sigelman 1979, 1204). 16

14

President Dwight Eisenhower and President Richard Nixon are exceptions since they performed better on foreign
and defense issues. President Lyndon Johnson and President Gerald Ford performed better on domestic issues
(Sigelman, 1979, 1203).
15
For Wildavsky, “the presidency had become even ‘more powerful vis-à-vis institutional competitors’” (Sigelman
1979, 1195). See, Aaron Wildavsky, “The Past and Future Presidency,” The Public Interest (Fall 1975): 57-58.
16
Sigelman argues “presidents have won approximately the same proportion of victories within their own party as
their predecessors, but have only very rarely proven able to muster majority support within the opposition party”
(Sigelman 1979, 1204).

20
In using boxscores, Wildavsky illustrates how “presidents prevail about 70 percent of the
time in defense and foreign policy, compared with 40 percent in [the] domestic sphere”
(Wildavsky 1966, 8).17 Critics of Wildavsky note the limitation in using boxscores since their
usage may skew the conclusions. Boxscores illustrate how “these measures are an indiscriminate
mixture of a few apples – major pieces of legislation – amidst a myriad of oranges – relatively
trivial concerns” (Sigelman 1979, 1198). For this reassessment of Wildsvsky, Sigleman focuses
on the 406 of the 582 key votes that took place between 1957 and 1978.18 Sigleman’s results
indicate that “three out of every four key vote tests of presidential support have focused on
domestic issues, a finding consonant with Wildavsky’s argument” (Sigelman 1979, 1200).
According to these key votes, presidents have been successful 56.5% on domestic policies while
being successful 60% on foreign and defense policies since 1973 (Sigelman 1979, 1200).19
Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell, and David Lewis (2008) also evaluate the
Two Presidencies Thesis. Success is measured when presidents “work hard informally to
counteract formal structures that limit their power in domestic policy, they are unlikely to
succeed fully so that a power differential matures in foreign and domestic policy” (Canes-Wrone,
Howell, and Lewis 2008, 14). They “[distill] an institutional logic that explains how first-mover
advantages, informational differences, and electoral pressures grant presidents greater influence

Other scholars, including Lance T. LeLoup and Steven A. Shull have analyzed this thesis. They concluded, “the
president was still receiving greater congressional support on foreign and defense than on domestic roll calls, but the
difference had become less pronounced than Wildavsky originally reported” (Sigelman 1979, 1198).
18
According to Sigelman, “For each of these 406 roll calls, it was first determined whether the president’s position
had been upheld or defeated, which entailed examining each roll call to find whether the president’s position had
been supported by a majority of those voting or, in a few cases, by an extraordinary majority (e.g. cloture votes,
Constitutional amendments) or by the one-third-one needed to stave off a veto-override attempt. Then for each year,
and ultimately for each presidency, the percentage of presidential victories on domestic and foreign and defense roll
calls, respectively, was also calculated” (Sigelman 1979, 1199).
19
President James Carter represents a “deviation” from this outcome, however, “roll calls on which the Carter
record is built is very small” (Sigelman 1979, 1200).
17
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in foreign than domestic affairs” (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008, 14). The deference by
Congress to presidents show the validity of this thesis. They “test for the existence of the two
presidencies in a specific domain that Congress cannot delegate, budgetary appropriations, and a
domain that explicitly incorporates delegation, agency creation” (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and
Lewis 2008, 14). Similarly to Sigleman, they assess the influence of party affiliation upon
support for the president and their policies. Their “findings hold even when controlling for a host
of other factors, including the possibility of bipartisanship in foreign affairs” (Canes-Wrone,
Howell, and Lewis 2008, 14). According to Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis, “regardless of
who is president, their ability to achieve objectives on issues of foreign and defense policy
should contrast strikingly with the progress of their domestic agenda” because
“this disjuncture is likely to be all the more striking if presidents mistakenly believe that they can
translate their achievements in foreign affairs to ones in domestic policy” (Canes-Wrone,
Howell, and Lewis 2008, 14).
Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, Glen Krutz, and Stephen Hanna (2000) explain that
“Wildavsky also argued that presidents should dominate Congress in foreign policy” while the
thesis “predicts high levels of success on foreign policy as well as differences between foreign
and domestic policy” (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000, 3). According to Fleisher, Bond,
Krutz, and Hanna, “the difference between foreign and domestic success rates shows up
consistently for minority presidents” and “the absolute level of support on foreign and defense
issues has declined since the second Reagan administration” (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna
2000, 3). In evaluating the influence of party affiliation upon support of the president, Fleisher,
Krutz, and Hanna conclude that “opposition party base behavior reveals that foreign policy
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voting has become considerably more partisan” (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000, 3). In
agreeing with Sigelman, they argue that the Vietnam War drastically influenced the
Congressional relationship to the president. They note how “characteristics of foreign and
defense issues that make them different from domestic issues still permit the president to lead in
times of international crisis” (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000, 22). While their critique
of the thesis does not argue the president is weak, their critique seeks to understand “the
conditions under which each branch can get the other to go along with its preferred policy”
(Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000, 23).
Other scholars seek to reexamine the Two Presidencies Thesis in more recent times.
Scot Schraufnagel and Stephen Shellman (2001) argue that “more discretion for the president in
the realm of foreign policy (or domestic policy for that matter) means more centralized decision
making and conceivably less democratic control” (Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001, 706). This
thesis “poses no threat to any benefits derived from interbranch competition” (Schraufnagel and
Shellman 2001, 706). In evaluating party affiliation and its influence upon support of the
president as Sigleman and Canes-Wrone Howell and Lewis evaluate, Schraufnagel and Shellman
explain, “it appears that there is no consistent increase in congressional support for the president
in foreign policy derived from opposition party members” (Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001,
706). Despite the removal of some roll call votes within their set of data, Schraufnagel and
Shellman determine “that presidents do not systematically receive more support in the foreign
policy realm” (Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001, 706). Their conclusions reaffirm the
conclusions of Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna (2000).
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In reaching a similar conclusion to the Two Presidencies Thesis, William Howell, Saul
Jackman, and Jon Rogowski (2013) use their Policy Priority Model to determine if and when
Congress defers to the president. This model, published in 2013 and through using game theory,
“[identifies] the parameters of the political environment that lead Congress to enact policies that
more closely resemble the president’s preferred policies” to create “a set of prediction about the
impact of war on presidential influence” (Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013, 31). Similar to
the Two Presidencies Thesis, the Policy Priority Model concludes that Congress defers to the
president in foreign policy and during times of war or national emergency. Despite their
different source base and use of a mathematical model, the thesis and model arrive at similar
conclusions that affirm how Congress defers to presidents in regard to foreign policy during
times of war or national emergency.
In assessing the Two Presidencies Thesis, scholars determine the times when the
Congress defers to the president regarding issues of foreign policy. This body of literature
exposes overarching issues between these two branches of government. Much like the other
bodies of literature, this aspect requires much examination of the context. The Two Presidencies
Thesis further exposes the factors of ongoing wars, the role of the opposition party, and how the
Vietnam War influenced this relationship among the president and Congress. Context is
additionally essential when evaluating the actions of Congress.
Despite the contributions of these bodies of literature, scholars have not addressed the
role of the president in implementation or enforcement of conscription. Throughout American
history, the president signed conscription bills into law to supplement the low totals of the United
States military. While the presidents have not taken a unilateral action to push for conscription

24
laws, they have been supportive of this military policy. Conscription, despite the war in which it
was used, continued to require the service of America’s male population. The usage of
presidential tools is contingent upon certain situations since presidents mostly use certain tools
when they would not be challenged by Congress or while presidents are enjoying comfortable
approval ratings. While there is an increased usage of certain presidential tools, their usage is
dependent on a given situation. Presidents can use unilateral actions, but some of these actions
can be challenged by Congress or have no legitimate legal value. The usage of unilateral actions
may bring press attention to an issue as it brings the president more attention. Scholars further
illustrate the deference of the Congress to the president for foreign policies. While most scholars
have noted the increased access to information, members of Congress have additionally deferred
to the president during times of war and national emergency. These studies expose the
limitations in the existing literature to illustrate specific cases to show the actions of the
presidents to protect the vital interest of conscription.

THEORY AND DISCUSSION
Conscription remained a contested military policy among factions of the American public
and among some members of Congress. Despite these challenges, conscription’s supporters in
Congress continued to implement pieces of legislation to require the registration and mandatory
service of young men. This military service, during declared and undeclared wars, became an
essential component of American military policy. Members of Congress remained vocal in their
support for or against conscription. Many of their arguments, either positive or negative,
remained consistent throughout American history. These arguments of support inform and
influence many of the statements made by the presidents. National defense, national security,
and obligations of citizenship remained constant themes of support for conscription. Those
opposed to this system of mandatory military service echoed the sentiments to protect personal
liberty, the benefits of volunteerism, and the flaws within conscription. Despite these criticisms
against conscription, presidents remained supportive of using conscription by signing the
conscription bills, making statements, and issuing executive orders regarding this policy.
While there have been some noticeably silent presidents, most have been vocal in their
support of conscription. In the case of President Wilson, for example, he made a proclamation
on the same day in which he signed the conscription bill into law. Most presidents have made
statements that encouraged compliance, emphasized punishments for disobedience, and
expressed their alteration to the law to increase fairness. After the formal end of conscription,
President Ford and President Carter made statements of support to eliminate punishments for
those that violated conscription policies during the Vietnam War. Overall, the presidents issued
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statements of support of conscription once the conscription bills had been passed by the
Congress.
The usage of a federally controlled system of manpower procurement illustrates a
significant alteration in military policy. Once the militia system was proven to be untenable, the
Congress passed legislation to create a federally controlled system. This new system eliminated
the reliance on states and their governors to muster their designated quotas of men into the
military. The proposal of a federally controlled system of conscription was not new when
proposed during the American Civil War. Since the War of 1812 had ended more quickly than
expected, the Congress suspended their plans to implement a federal system of conscription.
Since its use during the American Civil War, federal conscription served the nation’s military
needs in all subsequent conflicts until it was replaced with the All Volunteer Force. The All
Volunteer Force took effect in 1973 following the Vietnam War. Even as conscription laws
changed, the basic premise remained consistent through the years. Conscription laws expired,
which prompted the Congress to draft and pass new legislation at moments when the nation
needed a system to ensure the requisite number of men were mustered into the military.
Conscription is an interesting case study to test the theories of critical juncture, path dependency,
power of the president, unilateral action, and the Two Presidencies Thesis since conscription
represented a significant deviation with existing military policy. The role of the president amid
the deviation of military policy is additionally important to examine.
Used during times of peace and during times war, the implementation of conscription
represents a critical juncture. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier (1991) define critical
juncture as “a period of significant change” that “produce distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier
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1991, 29). In using conscription as an example, the implementation of conscription was a
departure from the militia system. This represents a critical juncture from past military policy in
the United States. In the study by Collier and Collier, these periods of critical juncture range in
time between nine and twenty-three years. Periods of an active draft in the United States ranged
from three years during the American Civil War to just under a decade during the Vietnam War.
Despite the varying amount of men conscripted in each conflict, the consistent use of
conscription represents this departure with previous methods that had been used to create a large
standing military. Periods of an active draft call often pertain to a particular conflict. These
conflicts often define the moment in American history to further illustrate a movement from
isolationism, the emergence of the Cold War, engagement during the Cold War, and the end of
conscription. At various moments in American history, conscription remained a constant policy.
Conscription remained the sole method used to supplement the small standing military. Despite
changes in American foreign and domestic policies, conscription remained a consistent policy.
It would be noteworthy to highlight the importance of significant changes to conscription
over time. In 1940, the Congress passed the nation’s first peacetime draft. While conscription
was not new, the usage of a peacetime draft represented a departure with earlier periods since an
active draft call commenced in the absence of an active conflict. Following World War II, the
Congress passed another peacetime conscription bill in 1948. In addition to this reinforcing an
important precedent, the conscription law of 1948 served as the model for the most modern
system of conscription. This marks another movement forward in the application of this type of
law. While some Americans (and members of Congress) were critical to the implementation of a
peacetime conscription call, this represents a critical juncture since this is a significant departure
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with previous policy to implement conscription calls following a formal declaration of war.
Conscription had been used to supplement a small standing military, but was now used to create
a large standing military during peacetime before American involvement in a conflict.
James Mahoney (2001) advances this idea of critical juncture. According to Mahoney,
critical junctures are a based upon intentional decisions “from among two or more alternatives”
when “willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntarist fashion than normal circumstances
permit” since “these choices demonstrate the power of agency by revealing how long-term
development patterns can hinge on distant actor decisions of the past” (Mahoney 2000, 6-7). In
the case of conscription, these essential actors would be the members of Congress that drafted
bills and voted favorably upon conscription laws. These individuals were the essential agents to
ensure this military policy continued to be used in America’s wars from the American Civil War
through and including the Vietnam War. Despite calls from opponents in the Congress and
unrest among civilians, conscription’s supporters played a vital role to implement and alter
conscription through American history. These changes (each time conscription bills were
passed) demonstrate a purposeful alteration to modernize this policy. These alterations, in the
view of conscription’s supporters, also sought to eliminate resistance against this policy.
In a related conception of context and cause and effect, Karen Orren and Stephen
Skowronek (2004) address events following critical junctures as they also note the importance of
path dependence. The linkage among different periods of development represent “the idea of
disjuncture in history, of a break with the past, and the historical nature of the new construction
that ensues” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 103-104). In understanding this path, or relationship
between the existing order and new order, this enables future scholars to examine development
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of political systems and the changes ushered in by a sequence of events. Paul Pierson (2004)
highlighted the importance of path dependence to understand “how the costs of switching from
one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time” and
expose “issues of timing and sequence” to understand “formative moments or conjectures from
the periods that reinforce divergent paths” (Pierson 2004, 19). This path, in Pierson’s view, may
be marked by “social mechanisms” (Pierson 2004, 28). Orren and Skowronek note the
limitations in this approach since it may be difficult to locate the exact moment or event that
caused a change in political development.
Despite its limitations, this approach can be used to understand the relationship among
changes to institutions, the implications of the historical context, and the role of politics (Orren
and Skowronek 2004, 107). These studies use historical examples such as the Progressive Era or
the implementation of the New Deal as key moments that forged new paths of political
development in the United States. These examples illustrate a significant departure with existing
understandings of the role of government, but further illustrate the movement forward for the
federal government to take an active role in regulations, a new political agenda, and the creation
of the welfare state. In understanding path dependence, these events show pivotal moments
when a selected action had been chosen since it has a lasting influence on future events. For
example, most American historians would agree that the New Deal(s) were a response and
extension of Progressive Era reforms that had taken place decades earlier.
In this study of conscription, many essential events shaped and influenced politics, the
military, and American society. In this path to implement conscription, past politicians had
exhausted other options before the implementation of federal conscription. The American Civil
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War, as most American historians would agree, represented a period when the federal
government (and its power) extended and expanded. The federalization of the railroad and
telegraph, for example, illustrate the changing nature of federal power. At that moment, when
enlistment had declined and state governors were withholding their state’s men for service, the
Congress created a federal system to directly conscript men into the United States military.
Previously, the militia system had allowed men to remain in service to their local states. The
conscripting of men directly into the United States military in 1863 illustrates an important path,
which was followed until 1973. As the nation entered World War I, again plagued with issues of
a small standing military, the Congress quickly changed conscription to eliminate many of its
prior flaws and limitations. In using the Enrollment Act of 1863 as a model, Congress quickly
passed a new conscription bill to register, train, and assemble men for the battlefields in Europe.
This path toward a federally controlled system began in 1812, but the War of 1812 ended before
the Congress implemented conscription. Once used in the American Civil War, the path had
been forged to affirm the importance of conscription as it was used during all other subsequent
wars.
Rather than revert back to using the militia system, the Congress continued to approve
bills to create federally controlled and maintained systems of conscription in 1917, 1940, 1948,
and 1967. The militia system, that had been used in the 18th and 19th Centuries, changed in 1903
through the formal creation of the National Guard. Changes to the militia during the American
Civil War further changed American attitudes from a state mentality to a federal mentality of
military service. This is a significant since it changed the understandings of service for a local
state toward the United States as a federal state. This understanding of service to the United
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States as a federal state, by extension, also reinforced the Congress to implement new
conscription bills to quickly increase the size of the military through a federally controlled and
maintained system. The system itself has changed over time, but the basic premise of federal
control has remained consistent over time. The role of the Congress to pass legislation and the
role of the president to sign the bills into law remained consistent over time.
Some scholars address and define power as it relates to presidents. As Richard Neustadt
(1960) demonstrates, presidents have the power to persuade. While there are limitations in
exercising this power since expectations and ability to execute may differ, Neustadt explains the
successes of presidents (Neustadt 1960, ix and 4). For Neustadt, this power to persuade is a tool
to be used in decision making. He further discusses the importance and limitations of bargaining
since it provides “no guarantees” and the president’s ability to “influence remains a two-way
street” (Neustadt 1960, 47). He uses the Marshall Plan (and President Truman’s role in that
process) to expose the role of the president. In this particular case, the president had a certain
advantage to have influence. As Neustadt argues, the success of President Truman in this postwar relief effort highlighted the president’s power regarding decision making and making
choices (Neustadt 1960, 47). Stephen Showronek defines power as “the resources, formal and
informal, that presidents in a given period, have at their disposal to get things done” (Skowronek
1993, 18). Both of these scholars highlight the presidents’ ability to exert this power upon those
in government, the presidents’ ability to make choices, and the presidents’ role in persuasion and
leadership. Both of these scholars group presidents upon criteria. Neustadt groups presidents as
premodern or modern. Skowronek groups presidents based upon patters of their behavior to
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continue existing alignment, preside over a time when existing ideologies decline, or serve to
reconstruct or restore political order.
While these scholars address a myriad of example and case studies to support their
categories and descriptions of political time, these scholars do not detail the presidents’ role
during the times when conscription was used to supplement a small standing military.
Conscription poses a unique case for presidents to influence public support and compliance for
this unpopular military policy. Despite this opportunity to use their power to persuade or “get
things done,” presidents have been noticeably absent in regard to conscription (Skowronek 1993,
18). While Neustadt addresses the role of presidents in war making, this work is devoid of
further discussion of the role of presidents in making decisions regarding the systems to muster
and raise the military during times of war. Neustadt, in using President Nixon’s expansion of the
Vietnam War into Cambodia, addresses overall uses of the military (Neustadt 1960, 196). While
this example does shows President Nixon’s use of the military to expand the conflict, this
example does not address the president’s role regarding conscription.
Skowronek uses President Lyndon Johnson as an example to illustrate his purposeful
effort to fight a war while he worked toward a large scale domestic program (Skowronek 1993,
343). In this case, Johnson weighed his options since he was determined not to suffer political
“stampede” by Republicans as President Truman had suffered during the Korean War
(Skowronek 1993, 343). At the height of the Vietnam War, nearly 40,000 men were drafted
monthly. Ultimately, Johnson was not able to serve his domestic and foreign policy items. As
Skowronek shows, President Johnson decision to withdraw from the 1968 election resulted from
his apprehension from further escalation of the Vietnam War. While this piece of Skowronek’s
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work does not explicitly address Johnson’s role regarding conscription, an escalation in fighting
would have caused an escalation in conscripted men. Skowronek does emphasize the power of
the presidents to accomplish agenda items and goals, but this example shows how Johnson was
placed “in the crossfire of demands that more be done on behalf of one or another of the
commitments that he pulled in his train” (Skowronck 1993, 356). In this instance, Johnson was
not able to wield his presidential powers to conclude the war (through using conscription or other
alternative means) or seek an additional term for the presidency.
In a related discussion of power, Louis Fisher (2014) shows changes among presidents as
they exerted power. Fisher notes the changes in existing literature since older literature had
argued that presidents exerted more power to act unilaterally, but newer scholarship has shown
that presidents are more restricted due to checks and balances (Fisher 2014, 167). This older
scholarship has been changed by more recent events, which include “presidential wars” and
presidential scandals (Fisher 2014, 168). In the case with conscription, the presidents in office
during its use, illustrate similar trends and modes of behavior. These presidents appear to follow
the actions of the Congress. They only made statements following a successful Congressional
vote to pass conscription legislation. Given that the executive and legislative branches are
granted different duties, this would serve as an example of Fisher’s conclusion of the role of
checks and balances. While presidents often made statements of support for the conscription
bill, presidents also expressed their role to enforce the laws as passed by the Congress. These
statements of support, again, are only issued following the favorable vote by the Congress since
these presidents have not taken a formal stance upon conscription before the law passed. Even
during the presidential campaign of 1940, President Roosevelt and Republican candidate
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Wendell Willkie voiced support of conscription just weeks before the election. Their statements
of support followed the favorable vote by the Congress to pass the conscription bill. As Fisher
notes, decisions by presidents (in more recent times) have been affected by the War on Terror.
This has ushered in “renewed respect for constitutional government,” and may be a factor to
consider if conscription would be used in the future to supplement the existing All Volunteer
Force (Fisher 2014, 168).
In taking this analysis a step further, some scholars have addressed the presidents’ power
to act unilaterally regarding policy. Kenneth Mayer (2001) categorizes executive orders as either
bargaining tools for presidents or as used to usher in immediate action. When used, in Mayer’s
view, presidents bypass any barrier of action by the courts or the Congress (Mayer 2002, 4).
While presidents may appear weak when evaluating their powers as granted in the Constitution,
Mayer stresses how executive orders provide presidents with powers to act without Congress.
William Howell (2003), in a similar conclusion to Mayer, argues that unilateral action enables
presidents to be effective leaders especially when not faced with resistance from the Congress or
courts. For Mayer and Howell, executive orders allow presidents to drive policy themselves
without waiting for the Congress to lead policymaking. Brandon Rottinghaus and Jason Maier
(2007) demonstrate the use of presidential proclamations as a “policy-making instrument”
(Maier 2007, 339). Rottinghaus and Maier note how the use of proclamations extend the power
of the presidents.
This literature exposes the presidents’ ability to initiate and take the lead in policy
formation. In the case of conscription, however, presidents have not taken unilateral action to
implement this military policy. Presidents have issued executive orders or made proclamations
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regarding conscription, but this followed the actions of Congress. In this case, these executive
orders and proclamations only reinforce the rules and regulations detailed in the law passed by
Congress. Presidents made bold statements regarding compliance to conscription laws, which
highlighted the provisions regarding punishment within the law. Some presidents did not make
formal proclamations or issue executive orders regarding conscription. In these instances,
presidents were not attached to this policy other than to sign the legislation. Conscription
remains an interesting case to examine since presidents have not taken unilateral action to
implement conscription. Their executive orders and proclamations have reinforced the laws or
were statements of support for the laws passed by Congress.
There are, however, several cases in which the presidents have taken a step forward in
regard to conscription. Once the bill was signed into law, some presidents have made statements
of support to fix provisions to make conscription more equitable among America’s men.
President Johnson and President Nixon issued statements that called for changes to the existing
system. Nixon, additionally, made statements in support of deferments that had been removed
by the Congress. While Johnson and Nixon supported conscription after its passage by
Congress, they were vocal in proposing changes to the system. Additionally, Johnson issued an
executive order to change the mailing of classification documentation. Nixon called for
significant changes to eliminate the length of eligibility, but further called the retention of
deferments for undergraduate and graduate students. While Johnson and Nixon supported the
Military Service Act of 1967 to implement conscription, their executive orders changed the
system that had been voted upon by the Congress.
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President Ford and President Carter dealt with conscription policy violators during their
terms. While started during Ford’s term, pardons and clemency were to be given to those that
met certain standards of review. Conscription laws throughout American history were detailed
regarding the punishments for violators. In a departure with the past, this would be the first time
violators were forgiven for their violations through a clemency board. Ford created a clemency
board and even extended the period of clemency to accept more violators. Carter continued this
effort when he issued an executive order the day after he was inaugurated as president. With the
formal end of registration and the implementation of the All Volunteer Force, Ford was focused
on reconciliation for those that violated the law. Carter continued this effort at the beginning of
his term.
This concept of unilateral action, however, may best be applied in the case of President
Carter. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter made a statement that called for the
restoration of registration for conscription. In a departure with other presidents, Carter issued a
statement informing Congress that he would like to reinstate registration given the current
international events. Carter was explicit regarding the amount of money he deemed suitable to
cover the cost of registration. In a drastic departure with previous uses of conscription, Carter
called for the registration of women. Carter wanted female registration to allow women to be
open for potential non-combat service in the military at the time of an active conscription call.
When Congress finally responded to Carter’s request to reinstate registration, the Congress did
not allocate the funds required for the registration of women. For Carter, the registration of
women sought to make conscription even more equitable than the earlier alterations of older
conscription laws. Congress disagreed with Carter’s proposed registration of women. This may
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be the most apparent example of a president taking an active role in setting policy. Despite
asking for the approval of the Congress, Carter deviated from previous registration policy to
make this shift toward gender equality among registrants.
Scholars have attempted to explain the relationship between the president and the
Congress. Aaron Wildavsky (1966) introduces this theory of this deference by the Congress to
the president regarding foreign policy issues. Lee Sigelman (1979) challenges this theory since,
as Sigelman argues, Congress once dominated foreign policy. Sigelman, however, did highlight
President Eisenhower and President Nixon’s success with foreign policy because of this
deference by the Congress (Sigelman 1979, 1203). Overall, in Sigelman’s work, the opposition
party was more consistently supportive of the president between 1957 and 1972 (Sigelman 1979,
1201). Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, Glen Krutz, and Stephen Hanna (2000) highlight the
differences between foreign and domestic policies as they argue the presidents still take the lead
amid international crisis (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000, 23). Scot Schraufnagel and
Stephen Shellman (2001), in reaffirming the findings of Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna
(2000), did not find that presidents consistently received increased support from the opposition
party for foreign policy nor did presidents receive greater overall support of foreign policy
initiatives (Schraufnagel and Stephen Shellman 2001, 706). Earlier literature indicates that the
Vietnam War changed the relationship between Congress and the president. William Howell,
Saul Jackman, and Jon Rogowski (2013) create their Policy Priority Model. For example,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President George W. Bush experienced minimal resistance
for their proposed budgets during World War II and following the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001 (Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013, 263). World War II and the War on Terror are
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significant since President Truman experienced disruption regarding budget approval amid the
Korean War.
Several scholars agree that Congress defers in the case of foreign policy since presidents
have greater access to information. In the case of conscription, Congress has taken a more active
role in this aspect. While conscription was mainly used for the purposes of foreign wars,
declared and undeclared, Congress took the lead to draft and pass bills to create a system of
registration that conscripted men directly into the United State military. The presidents largely
waited for these bills to pass within the Congress before making statements of support and pleas
for compliance. In using conscription as a case study, the presidents waited to respond to the
actions of the Congress. Some presidents, in using President Eisenhower as an example, were
silent on making any proclamations or issuing any executive orders regarding conscription.
Upon each time a conscription bill passed in the Congress, the incumbent president signed the
bill into law.
There are some notable cases in which the president sought to influence conscription.
Nixon made a statement in 1969 to the Congress to eliminate conscription. When conscription
was set to expire in 1971, however, Nixon called for the Congress to extend the law for two more
years. Congress extended the law, and conscription ended in 1973. Nixon was the first president
to propose an end to conscription. President Nixon issued remarks supportive of voluntary
enlistment, but also issued his suggestions to make conscription more equitable for America’s
men. Nixon was also instrumental in his efforts to use “random selection” or the lottery system
to select men based on their birth days rather than age. Efforts for fairness did not originate with
Nixon. Following the American Civil War, James Oakes (the organizer of the Union’s
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conscription plan) wrote his plan for improvement. Many of his suggestions were used when
conscription was implemented during World War I, but these changes were not directly proposed
by President Wilson. President Johnson had ordered a special commission to evaluate
conscription in 1966 since Johnson felt conscription needed to be improved to increase fairness.
These efforts illustrate the actions of certain presidents, but they worked within the system that
had been created by Congress. President Carter may represent a significant departure since
Carter called for the Congress to resume registration in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. As the Cold War continued, Carter argued the importance of registration amid this
threat of Soviet action. While Carter called for the registration of men and women, Congress
pushed back by only appropriating funds for the registration of men.
Since its use during the American Civil War, federal conscription expanded the size of
the nation’s military. Conscription finally ended with the creation of the All Volunteer Force in
1973, which coincided with the expiration of the last conscription act. Conscription laws
changed, but their basic structure and guidelines remained consistent between 1917 and 1967.
As conscription laws expired, the Congress drafted and passed new legislation to serve the
nation’s military need. Used during peacetime and during times of war, conscription remained a
consistent military policy during specific moments between 1863 and 1973. American attitudes
of service changed. Despite the unpopularity of conscription, the militia system was deemed
outdated, outmoded, and unreliable to amass a sizable standing military.
Conscription is an interesting case study to examine when applying the theories of critical
juncture, path dependency, power of the president, unilateral action, and the Two Presidencies
Thesis. In a departure with the militia system, the implementation of federal conscription
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signifies a critical juncture. In creating this new system, Congress passed legislation to directly
conscript men into the United States military. The usage of the peacetime conscription law is
also a critical juncture from past since conscription had only previously been used during times
of war. The theory of path dependence shows further implications upon American attitudes of
service to the nation. Previously, men understood service as service to their local states rather
than the federal state. This changed the expectations of service since all subsequent wars
brought men directly into the United States military. The theories of unilateral action should not
be broadly used to explain the actions of all presidents at the time of an active draft. There are,
however, few instances in which presidents took unilateral action in regard to conscription.
Presidents have largely followed the action of Congress when they drafted and passed bills
regarding conscription. The Two Presidencies Thesis has been used to explain the deference of
Congress to presidents in matters of foreign policy, but conscription largely remains an example
of Congress leading the action. While there are some noted exceptions (such as President Nixon,
President Ford, and President Carter), presidents have mostly followed Congress rather than take
an outward stance regarding conscription.
These theories provide a framework of analysis upon this chosen case. Conscription
became a familiar military policy over time since it was used in all of America’s wars from the
American Civil War to the Vietnam War. While the conscription laws differed in some details,
their overarching structure remained unchanged over time. Presidents, overall, have waited for
the Congress to favorably vote upon conscription before they have taken any action of their own.
Even as the arguments of support and opposition remained similar in tone over time, these
statements did little to change the structure or nature of conscription in the United States.
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Despite unrest and resistance against conscription, the presidents signed conscription bills,
remarked on the importance of conscription, and made pleas to America’s men to comply with
these policies.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND CONSCRIPTION: CASE STUDIES
This section examines each of America’s wars as case studies to expose the actions of the
Congress and president. During each conflict, and even during times of peace, the Congress
passed a conscription bill that was then signed by the president. Presidents issued presidential
proclamations and executive orders regarding these conscription laws. As shown, the presidents
overall were supportive of conscription. While some presidents uttered sentiments to alter and
adjust conscription for the sake of fairness, conscription remained the preferred method of
manpower procurement between 1863 and 1973. Even President Nixon’s intended call to
abolish conscription was short lived since he ultimately called for the extension of conscription
for an additional two years. This section highlights the complexities of dealing with civil war
and foreign conflict while faced with a small standing military. While there have been some
silent presidents, presidents mainly voiced support for compliance and their intentions of
enforcement. President Carter, in a stark contrast with previous presidents, called for Congress
to resume registration as he also called for the registration of women. These cases further
illustrate the importance of conscription as a military policy once the militia system was
abandoned in 1862 since federal conscription remained consistent in design and application until
1973.
American Civil War
Unlike earlier conflicts, the American Civil War posed the greatest crisis to muster in a
sizable force to continue the fighting. Despite the calls for volunteers, the Congress passed the
Militia Act of 1862 to allow the state governors to use militiamen forces toward their federally
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mandated state quotas. This act permitted President Abraham Lincoln to make decisions
regarding the use and deployment of militia forces.20 Since militiamen were now designated
under federal direction, each state was now required to submit a designated quota of men for the
Union military based on their state’s population. Previous restrictions had limited terms of
service between three to six-month terms, however, this new act allowed President Lincoln to
require militiamen to serve for up to nine-month terms. This law further permitted the acceptance
of up to 100,000 militiamen for federal service. This effort, however, was ineffective in raising
the necessary totals of troops required for the war effort. As officials within the US War
Department and politicians quickly realized, this method of using militiamen to supplement low
troop totals was no longer viable after 1862. Despite these efforts to encourage voluntary
enlistment, Lincoln called for an additional 300,000 militiamen on August 4, 1862. While many
politicians were optimistic that this system would solve the issue, this initial system only raised
between 60,000 and 70,000 men.21
Members of the Congress were mainly divided for ideological reasons on whether to
support federal conscription. American historians agree that the efforts to create a federal system
of conscription resulted from the Confederate States of America’s federal system of conscription
that had been approved in 1862. Republicans mainly argued that the Congress, through this new
proposed plan of a federal system of conscription, had the power to employ various means to
wage war. Conscription, according to these supporters, created a democratic method of selection
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and enrollment of men for the Union military. Opponents of conscription, however, viewed
conscription as effort to expand the power of the Congress as it limited personal liberty of the
conscripted man. Federal conscription, from this opposing perspective, violated individual
liberty since it eliminated ability for a man to make a choice to enlist in the military. Democrats
believed Congress had the ability to raise and supply armies since these powers were granted in
the Constitution by using existing methods of manpower procurement. Despite these powers in
the Constitution, conscription’s opponents believed the existing militia system was the only
permissible way to increase the size of the standing military. Even considering these ideological
divisions and debates among members of Congress, the Enrollment Act passed and was signed
by Lincoln on March 3, 1863.
A week after the implementation of the Enrollment Act, President Abraham Lincoln
issued a proclamation regarding the soldiers that had since left the military. Lincoln ordered
“that all soldiers enlisted or drafted in the service of the United States now absent from their
regiments without leave shall forthwith return to their respective regiments.”22 These soldiers,
given the deadline of April 1, 1863, were to return to their units without facing any punishment
for their absences. Lincoln’s proclamation further addressed those “evil-disposed and disloyal
persons at sundry places” that “enticed and procured soldiers to desert and absent themselves
from their regiments.”23 Lincoln believed these individuals further weakened the Union’s war
effort, but these actions further provided aid to the Confederate cause. These actions to subvert
the strength of the Union military, in Lincoln’s view, established “increased hardships and
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danger.”24 Lincoln made a plea for “all patriotic and faithful citizens to oppose and resist the
aforementioned dangerous and treasonable crimes” since Lincoln called for Americans to
“support the proper authorities in the prosecution and punishment of offenders against said act
[Enrollment Act] and in suppressing the insurrection and rebellion.”25
President Lincoln issued four more calls for volunteers between June 1863 and December
1864. Conscription calls were placed throughout the Union districts with low troop enlistment.
Districts would be spared from a conscription call if enough men had joined or remained in the
military. In June 1863, Lincoln called for 100,000 militiamen from the states of Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.26 These militiamen, called for a six-month term of
service, were being federalized by President Lincoln. Once brought into active service, these
four states would receive credit under the Enrollment Act for filling their mandated quotas.
According to Lincoln’s proclamation, these men would be used for infantry, artillery, and
cavalry. These men would “be organized according to the rules and regulations of the volunteer
service and such orders as may hereafter be issued.”27 In October 1863, Lincoln issued another
proclamation calling for another 300,000 volunteers. Unlike his previous proclamation,
militiamen were not being federalized in this call. This proclamation, Proclamation 107, called
“upon the governors of the different States to raise and have enlisted into the United States
service for the various companies and regiments in the field from their respective States their
quotas of 300,000 men.”28 Lincoln indicated that the next draft call would commence on January
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5, 1864 for those districts that provided insufficient numbers. Proclamation 107, according to
Lincoln, would not “interfere with existing orders, or those which may be issued, for the present
draft in the States where it is not in progress or where it has not yet commenced.”29 As with the
earlier act, Lincoln made a plea for compliance of the law. Lincoln called for those to provide
“willing, cheerful, and effective aid to the measures thus adopted.”30
By the summer months of 1864, the Congress responded to the Union’s military troubles
with a new law. This law, An Act to Regulate and Provide for the Enrolling and Calling Out the
National Forces and for Other Purposes, allowed Lincoln to make further calls for volunteers for
terms of service ranging from one to three years. Initial calls for volunteers were for terms of six
months, but now men would be required to serve longer terms of service. Proclamation 116
indicated that this new act would give Congress the responsibility of “recruiting and keeping up
the strength of the armies in the field, for garrisons, and such military operations as may be
required for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion and restoring the authority of the United
States government.”31 As with the earlier acts, districts were to receive credit for all men that
had entered military service. Districts would be spared from a draft call if they mustered in the
requisite number of troops. Proclamation 116 requested another 500,000 volunteers for service.
By December 1864, Lincoln issued Proclamation 121 that served as a call for 300,000 more
volunteers.32 The previous call for 500,000 had been adjusted to 280,000. Because of this
adjustment, the United States War Department needed to compensate for the current deficiency
of 260,000 men. This call sought to fill the deficiency while also adding 40,000 more men into
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military service. This proclamation, like Proclamation 116, required the service of men for terms
of one, two or three years. As with earlier acts, districts were be spared from a draft if enough
men had been mustered into service.
These proclamations show the challenges to maintain a sizable military to fight the war.
Federal conscription, thought to solve issues regarding the proper size of the military, created a
federally maintained military force. Federalization of militia and the further calls for volunteers
expose issues in maintaining a sizable military force. Several of the proclamations attribute the
dwindling size of the military to combat deaths. Lincoln’s final proclamation during the
American Civil War, Proclamation 124, sought to address the continued problem with desertion.
A week after the issuance of the Enrollment Act in 1863, Lincoln called for deserters to rejoin
the Union military. In March 1865, Lincoln made another call for deserters to return to active
service. The Enrollment Act had been amended to include provisions regarding citizenship. The
amended law included new punishments for those that violated the law, which would result in a
man’s loss of citizenship. Proclamation 124 addressed this new provision to punish deserters by
noting how they “voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship and their right
to become citizens.”33 In order to encourage men to return to active service, Lincoln offered
clemency for deserters if they returned to active service by May 10, 1865. Men remained free
from punishment provided they “return to their regiments and companies or to such other
organizations as they may be assigned to and serve the remainder of their original terms of
enlistment and in addition thereto a period equal to the time lost by desertion.”34 In receiving a
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pardon, these men were absolved of punishment for their desertion as it also removed the
negative stigma for desertion.
Following its use in the American Civil War, James Oakes (the organizer of the Union’s
conscription system) offered suggestions to improve and alter conscription to prevent resistance.
Despite implementing many of his suggestions, resistance still occurred when conscription was
used to amass a large standing military during World War I. One of the key changes to
modernize conscription, when used during World War I, was self-registration. Unlike the
American Civil War, men were now required to register themselves rather than be registered by
the military’s provost marshals. To further remove the involvement of the military in this
process, local draft boards were created and maintained by civilians. For Oakes, these changes
were expected to usher in drastic results and acceptance of conscription since this eliminated the
role of the military as being involved in conscription policies.
World War I
The United States needed to quickly assemble a military force for this conflict once they
formally entered World War I. As a response to American involvement in this conflict, the size
of the American military drastically expanded on May 18, 1917. The passage of H. R. 3545: “An
Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United
States” ushered in another federal system of conscription. This act rested on “the existing
emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available.”35 President
Woodrow Wilson was authorized to “raise by draft as herein provided, organize, and equip an
additional force of five hundred thousand enlisted men, or such part or parts thereof as he may at
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any time deem necessary.”36 This law additionally detailed the punishments for failure to
comply with the law.37 Roughly 20% of those aged eighteen to forty-five, a total of 3,893,340
men, were inducted into military service at this time (Keene, 2006, 33). Of this draft eligible age
group, 2,810,296 of this total of men were drafted (Keene, 2006, 33).38
As in the case of the American Civil War, conscription was implemented as a solution for
the military needs of the United States. At this time, the size of the standing military was less
than 300,000 total enlisted officers and men. In his speech to advocate for a formal declaration
of war, President Wilson said,
[the fighting] will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States
already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who
should, in my opinion, by chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and
also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they
may be needed and can be handled in training.39

The Congress voted 82 to 6 in the Senate and 373 to 50 in the House in support of a formal
declaration of war upon Germany.
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As voluntary enlistment had again declined, the Congress responded with another
conscription bill to initiate another federally controlled system of conscription. Republican
Representative Julius Kahn introduced the Selective Service Act, which implemented a series of
conscription calls. A conscription call, and registration for conscription, was set by the Congress
and president. This conscription act also designated the age range for registration, and set
deferments that would excuse certain men from service. It eliminated the usage of substitutes
and the payment of a commutation fee, which had been allowed under the Enrollment Act during
the American Civil War. In an effort of fairness, these such provisions were eliminated when the
new conscription law was used during World War I.
The members of Congress, that supported conscription, expressed their belief that men
were required to serve the nation in times of need. They additionally expressed a desire to
ensure a plan was in place to ensure they mustered in the proper amount of men for the war
effort rather than rely on volunteerism. Representative Frederick Lehlback (R-NJ) explained,
“the liability of all to serve in time of national danger is indisputable. It is, of course, not
intended to compel anyone to serve for whom any reasonable excuse exists for remaining at
home.”40 Lehlback further argued, “there exists no reason why the burden of fighting the war
should rest solely on those who realize their duty in the premises and not as well upon those to
whom their duty must be pointed out.”41 In echoing a similar sentiment, Representative John
Rogers (R-MA) stated, “a man is told exactly what his ‘bit’ is. If he is not called upon for
service, he can continue his vocation with the assurance that no stigma or odium attaches to him-
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that if the Government wants him it will call him, and that so long as it does not call him he is
doing the proper thing to stay where he is.”42
In addressing the issue of a volunteer force and the responsibilities of America’s men,
Representative William Borland (D-MO) noted the limitations of relying on volunteerism. As he
explained, “it leaves a great many men at home who ought to be serving their country at the
front.”43 In his view, “democracy demands that where there is an equality of right and
opportunity there is also equality of duty and responsibilities. It is the duty of Congress to see
that this equality is enforced by effective legislation.”44 Representative Dudley Doolittle (D-KS)
argued, “in a land of equal opportunity and favor there shall also be equal liability and equal
obligation resting upon one and all alike when the Nation needs its sons on the battle field [sic].
Selective conscription, as defined by the President, the Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, is not a last alternative; it is a first choice.”45
Opponents to conscription expressed concern with the growing expanse of the military
and extensions beyond the powers of Congress. In using letters from unions from within his
district, Representative Isaac Sherwood (D-OH) voiced his opposition to conscription.
Sherwood used testimonials from the Machinist Union and the Glass Workers Union of Toledo,
Ohio.46 As Sherwood indicated, the testimonial from the Glass Workers Union was further
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supported by a letter from a Union veteran from the American Civil War. These fears, evidenced
in the letters sent to Sherwood, touched upon potential fears to “establish military autocracy” and
the infringement of states to make decisions regarding militias and training by requiring federal
service.47 David Hollingsworth (R-OH) also voiced concerns regarding conscription since he
viewed this a measure to encourage militarism within American society. Hollingsworth said, “I
would rather resign and let the people back home send to Washington a more subservient tool of
militarism.”48 In his view, conscription and the amass of a large standing military represented
“the end of free institutions in America, destructive of that form of government which Lincoln in
his inspired words at Gettysburg said our forefathers had brought forth on this continent and
which he and other sturdy, unflinching American patriots have ever since maintained without
foreign cooperation or entanglements.”49
Based on the contents of the act, this act was important to respond with “the existing
emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available.”50 President
Woodrow Wilson supported the measure, and signed the bill into law on May 18, 1917. Wilson,
fearful of resistance against this policy, ordered that this measure be called Selective Service
rather than conscription. Wilson believed the term ‘conscription’ bore such a negative
connotation, which would cause resistance. Despite the change in terminology, Americans
resisted against conscription during this conflict. Even after his order to refrain from using the
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term ‘conscription,’ Wilson issued a proclamation titled ‘conscription’ to inform Americans of
the military policy.
President Wilson issued a proclamation on May 18, 1917. This proclamation,
Proclamation 1370, outlined the requirements of self-registration of men, the penalties for those
that did not register, and the penalties for men that committed fraud. Much like President
Lincoln’s call for assistance from the states’ governors, President Wilson made a similar plea for
cooperation. Wilson’s proclamation noted that governors were liable to contribute to the success
of Selective Service. President Wilson, similar to President Lincoln, made pleas to a man’s
patriotism. Both of these presidents used patriotism as a measure to determine the loyalty and
obedience of men to comply or support this military policy. Wilson took this idea a step farther
to discuss how compliance for this military policy illustrated how the United States then emerged
as “the whole nation [as] an army.”51 Wilson briefly mentioned the concerns of heightened
militarization in Europe, and how these nations were fighting a total war. As Wilson explained,
“there are no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed.”52 This notion was further
expounded upon when Wilson explained, “the men who remain to till the soil and man the
factories are no less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags.”53
In order to ensure the success of the Allies, Wilson wrote, “all must pursue one purpose. The
Nation needs all men, but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in
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the endeavor that will best serve the common good.”54 The United States, in this sense, needed
to function like a “team,” thus allowing men to “play the part for which he is best fitted.”55
This effort to place men in their proper roles, according to Wilson, would be through the
legislation of the Congress. “Congress,” as Wilson noted, “has provided that the Nation shall be
organized for war by selection, that each man shall be classified for service in the place to which
it shall best serve the general good to call him.”56 While conscription was not new, Wilson
explained that this moment was significant for the United States since “it is a new manner of
accepting and vitalizing our duty to give ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common
purpose of us all” since “it is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling” because this
represented “selection from a Nation which has volunteered.”57 For Wilson, this signified “the
day which the manhood of the country shall step forward in one solid rank in defense of the
ideals to which this Nation is consecrated” since it was vital “that there be no gaps in the
ranks.”58
The day of registration for those men eligible based on age, denoted the importance of
participation of America’s men. Wilson detailed this day for its “significance” as he stressed the
“honor” of this day for the United States.59 Wilson referred to registration day “as a great day of
patriotic devotion and obligation” for America’s men.60 Registration was called a man’s
“duty.”61 All Americans, however, were expected to participate. As Wilson explained, “whether
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he is himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the
designated ages is written on the lists of honor.”62 This is similar in nature to President Lincoln’s
call for compliance since Lincoln also cautioned against Americans that impeded this military
policy. Lincoln and Wilson both expressed fear of disobedience as a disruption to the proper
operation of military conscription. Lincoln and Wilson also similarly highlighted the
consequences for disobedience. Lincoln and Wilson, in understanding the importance of their
role as commander in chief, knew of importance of conscription as a military policy to allow for
the quick buildup of American military forces.
World War II
Even before the formal declaration of war, the Congress passed the first peacetime draft.
On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 required the registration
of all men between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five. In its first year, 900,000 men were
authorized for conscription. Those selection from among the registrants were required to serve
one year in the American military, but these terms of service were extended to the entire duration
of the fighting once war was formally declared. Conscription did not become a partisan issue in
1940 since Republicans (most notably Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie)
supported conscription. Average Americans questioned the use of conscription during
peacetime. Despite the apprehension of average Americans to support conscription, Congress
supported the extension of the Selective Training and Service Act for an additional year through
a one-vote margin in the House of Representatives.
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The Selective Training Act, also called the Burke-Wadsworth Act, was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Edward Burke (D-NE) and Senator James Wadsworth (R-NY). At the behest
of President Franklin Roosevelt, these senators drafted legislation to address manpower
limitations of the nation in the absence of declared war. This act passed the Senate on August
28, 1940, and passed the House on September 7, 1940. Roosevelt signed this act into law on
September 16, 1940. According to the act, its purpose was to “increase and train the personnel
of the armed forces of the United States.”63 To address criticism regarding a formal declaration
of war, this act noted, “the President is authorized from time to time, whether or not a state of
war exists, to select and induct into the land and naval forces of the United States for training and
service, in the manner provided in this Act, such number of men as in his judgement is
required.”64 According to the act, active times of war allow the military to increase in size to
reach the capacity of at least 900,000 men. This act noted the “duty” of men to comply to this act
through registration with Selective Service as a requirement of citizenship.65
Representative Harry Sheppard (D-CA), echoed the sentiments of preparedness as he
used a letter from a local newspaper to express his thoughts of support of conscription.
According to the article, conscription represented “being ready when our services are needed.
We may never have to use these services, but there can be no danger in preparing.”66
Representative Carey Kefauver (D-TN) referenced a letter written by a veteran of World War I
that mirrored the same sentiments of preparedness. This letter indicated a fear that the United
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States was not ready to face large standing militaries if the United States remained reliant on
volunteerism.67 To address issues of religion, Representative John Delaney (D-NY) submitted a
letter by Reverend John Gorman in support of conscription. According to the letter by Reverend
Gorman, “fear that the proposed conscription will lead to aggression on our part is less risky than
the fear that we may not be prepared to preserve our liberties and form of government if we are
suddenly attacked and found unprepared.”68
Senator Edward Burke (D-NE) argued, “it is upon the solid premise that the duty of
defending our free institutions rests not alone upon the eager patriot who is ready to make every
sacrifice that he may be prepared to protect his country; it is an obligation that bears with equal
weight upon every male citizen.”69 Senator James Byrnes (D-SC) explained that preparedness
was vital to the nation, but also vital to the soldiers themselves. According to Byrnes, “sending
untrained boys, with or without modern armored, motorized, and mechanized implements of war,
against such specialists as Hitler has in such machines, is just like sending naked Indians in
canoes, armed with bows and arrows, out against a first-class battleship.”70 Senator Joseph
Guffey (D-PA) said, “conscription is not something we want. It is something forced upon us by
world events. Most American realize that, as the Gallup polls show. Most Americans
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understand that conscription is both the most efficient and most democratic way of building an
army – in time.”71
Representative Robert Secrest (D-OH) expressed his opposition with conscription since
the United States was not in a period of declared war. Secrest said, “we must not surrender to
panic or hysteria” since “Congress should be careful not to destroy any part of the old American
tradition of free choice unless there is no other way to meet the present emergency.”72
Representative Lewis Thill (R-WI) submitted a speech by Danial Webster (an opponent to
conscription in 1814), which focused on the limits of government to require mandatory military
service. Representative John Schafer (R-WI) cautioned against conscription as he also cautioned
against the New Deal being used “to establish a dictatorship in the United States.”73 In Schafer’s
view, conscription “in a democracy in time of peace in indefensible.”74 Senator Guy Gillette
suggested the Congress should “aim at a highly mechanized force instead of the old mass army,
and should see what a sensible volunteering campaign will do.”75
Representative Martin Sweeney (D-OH) used his floor time to discuss an article
published in the Washington Times-Herald. This article described those opposed to conscription
as “Nazi, anti-British, Communist sources.”76 Representative Stephen Bolles (R-WI) highlighted
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the opposition among members of various religious communities. In this conscription law,
according to Bolles, conscription was a violation of religious freedom since it did not provide the
same exemptions for members of the clergy. Bolles said, “every religious American should
request his Senators and his Congressmen jealously to safeguard the rights of his constituents.”77
Senator Rush Holt (D-WV) referenced a publication by the American Federation of Labor
(AFL). In this document, the AFL cautioned against conscription since “conscription of an
Army of millions of soldiers to be carried out at once is a wasteful and an extravagant
proposal.”78 Representative Raymond Springer (R-IN) said, “many of our people are frightened
because they see their liberty and freedom slowly vanishing.”79 Representative George Dondero
(R-MI) submitted a letter from the Mothers of the United States of America to illustrate the fears
regarding conscription. This organization indicated, “we are not opposed to the principle of
military training, but we are against certain specific sections of the bill and the apparently
cleverly planned regimentation of all of us under the European corporate-state plan.”80
President Franklin Roosevelt, astutely aware of the escalation of tensions internationally,
signed the legislation for America’s first peacetime draft. Roosevelt said, “a few weeks have
seen great nations fall. We cannot remain indifferent to the philosophy of force now rampant in
the world.”81 To put this into context, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was signed
in September 1940, which was more than a year before the attack upon Pearl Harbor. President
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Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2425 to detail the necessity of this peacetime draft. According to
Roosevelt,
it is imperative to increase and train the personnel of the armed forces of the United
States and that in a free society the obligations and privileges of military training and
service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective
compulsory military training and service.82
One of the persisting criticisms of conscription was the fairness placed upon all eligible males.
Its critics argued that Selective Service placed an unfair burden upon certain men within
American society, which included minorities, those unable to attend college for career
advancement, and those with less financial stability or security. In order to calm or reassure
these critics, Roosevelt said, “the Congress has debated without partisanship and has now
enacted a law establishing a selective method of augmenting our armed forces. This method is
fair, it is sure, it is democratic – it is the will of our people.”83
Roosevelt, like Lincoln and Wilson, called for the cooperation of the states’ governors.
Roosevelt further asked for the assistance of employers to provide time for their workers to
register. This registration, in Roosevelt’s view, represented “the first step, our young men will
come from the factories and the fields, the cities and the town, to enroll their names on
registration day.”84 Participation in this act, and the buildup of the United States military,
represented the “spirit that the people of our country are assuming the burdens that now become
necessary” since “there is both the opportunity and the need for many thousands to assist” in this
call of service.85 For Roosevelt, this call to service represented America’s ability to use its “great
potential strength to fend off war from our shores. We must and will prevent our land from
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becoming a victim of aggression.”86 In reaffirming the importance of self-registration and
participation of America’s male population, Roosevelt said, “may we all strengthen our resolve
to hold high the torch of freedom in this darkening world so that our children and their children
may not be robbed of their rightful inheritance.”87
In October of 1940, weeks after the implementation of the peacetime draft, Roosevelt
issued a message directed at America’s male population. This message, given on October 16,
1940, sought to highlight America’s “pressing need for a stronger defense, and its vital meaning”
to America’s men.88 This message, brief in length, targeted America’s men toward compliance
of the law. Roosevelt continued by explaining, “I would tell you that the task before us today is
as compelling as any that ever confronted our people.”89 In a similar tone to that of Wilson,
Roosevelt echoed these sentiments of a joint, community effort. As Roosevelt noted, “each of us
must willingly do his bit if we are to hold fast our heritage of freedom and our American way of
life.”90 As with the selection process, it was unknown which men would be selected for service.
This was a period when the older men would be selected first. This practice changed when
conscription was used during the Vietnam War since the younger registrants were selected first
from among the total pool of registrants. In addressing the selection process, Roosevelt said,
“whether or not you are to be among those selected, I welcome you as one whose name has been
inscribed on the roll of honor of those Americans ready.”91
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By December 7, 1941, Selective Service continued to expand the size of the standing
military. Roughly fifty million men, between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four, were
registered with Selective Service. They screened eighteen million men, and drafted roughly ten
million men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight into service. Another six million
Americans volunteered between December 1941 and the early months of 1943 since the Navy
and Marine Corps only accepted volunteers until this time. General Lewis Hersey, the director
of Selective Service, wanted Selective Service to remain an autonomous agency rather than fall
under supervision of the War Manpower Commission, which was created in April 1942. Much
to the pleasure of General Hersey, Selective Service remained an autonomous agency.
As with earlier conscription laws, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940
contained provisions for men to avoid service for assorted reasons. Deferments, or exemptions,
were available for elected officials, those unhealthy or unfit for service, religious ministers, and
those employed in industries deemed important by the federal government. One of the most
complicated deferments would be for those classified as conscientious objectors. Conscientious
objectors were defined as men that were morally or religiously opposed to warfare, which would
prevent them from participating in the conflict. This deferment, difficult to obtain, required
significant attention in this act.
Conscientious objector deferments were two-fold. A man could be placed into a noncombat role upon advisement of the officials in the local draft board. Otherwise, men were
completely excused from participating in the war effort in any capacity. If the man was morally
opposed to participate in the war (even in a non-combat role), the man could be assigned to
perform another service to the federal government. A man could challenge a failed appeal for
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conscientious objector status with their local draft board by filing proper appeal paperwork.
Once the paperwork was received, it would be sent to the United States Department of Justice for
review to reconsider each case individually. The man would attend a hearing by the Department
of Justice to evaluate “the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned.”92
Officials in the Justice Department would then determine if a man qualified for a non-combat
role or was ordered to fill a job within a vital industry. The local draft board was then advised of
the Justice Department’s recommendation for the man. Local draft boards made the final
determination to classify the man, and were not bound to follow the recommendation of the
Justice Department.
Most of the punishments rendered during this war were because of conscientious
objectors. According to the Selective Training and Service Act, men were to “be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000 or by both such
fine and imprisonment, or if subject to military or naval law may be tried by court martial, and
on, conviction, shall suffer such punishment as a court martial.”93

Nearly ten million men

received assorted deferments. Nearly five million men appealed their initial classifications.
While 70,000 men received the contentious objector deferment, and 25,000 of these were
assigned to non-combat roles. Roughly 6,000 men went to jail rather than complying with the
Selective Service System.94 Many of these men were Jehovah’s Witnesses that were denied
reassignment because of their religious beliefs. The Justice Department, however, did not
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believe these men abhorred the use of force in every and all circumstances. In an act of defiance,
these men chose to go to prison. The pursuit to punish conscientious objectors illustrates the
government’s efforts to punish those that violated the law or those that did not comply with the
law. While Roosevelt expressed adherence to conscription law, he did not explicitly make
further statements regarding punishments for non-compliance.
The Korean War
Following the conclusion of World War II, the Congress further addressed mandatory
service for America’s male population. In June of 1948, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was
enacted. This act created the modern system of conscription to be used in the Korean War and
the Vietnam War. As with earlier acts, men as young as eighteen were required to register.
Unlike the earlier acts, this act did not place a cap to limit the registration of men based on age.
During World War II, all men up to the age of sixty-four were required to register. The Selective
Service Act of 1948 required the registration of men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six
as it also made them eligible for a twenty-one month term of military service. Men could then
determine if they would serve an additional twelve months of active service or serve thirty-six
months in the reserves. Under this act, men served a minimum of five years of service to the
United States.95
Under this act, the Congress indicated they passed this act as a measure to provide for the
“adequate armed strength” to “insure the security of this Nation” since within “a free society the
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obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve.”96 The Congress,
according to this act, “shall determine the units and organizations” needed to provide for a
military.97 This act outlined the training and service for men between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six. As with the earlier acts, the president was given the authority to summon men for
conscription during formally declared war or during times of peace. Conscription was
contingent upon the military needs of the time of a conscription call. The Secretary of Defense
was also involved to make the determination of conscription calls and quotas.
As with earlier laws, this law contained penalties for noncompliance. Those that
“knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty” or those “charged with such duty” and fail to
complete their task would be liable for punishment.98 Men that neglected to register with
Selective Service, failed to report, or those that “knowingly counsels, aids, or abet another to
refuse or evade registration or service” were equally liable for punishment.99 Men, that were
eligible for conscription, could volunteer for military service rather than wait to be conscripted
into service. Following World War II, budget constraints only allowed the selection of 100,000
men to be selected in 1948 under this new law.
Those in support of conscription believed this measure was imperative for national
defense purposes. Senator Herbert O’Conor (D-MD) explained, “We believe it is the most
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effective and least expensive plan for national security in this perilous period that has yet been
advanced.”100 Representative William Stevenson (R-WI) used a letter written by the American
Legion in La Crosse, Wisconsin to convey his support for conscription. This letter expressed
support for universal training since “peace is worth striving for.”101 Representative Lyndon
Johnson (D-TX) said,
Defensive strength is a compound of many things. First, there must be a national
consciousness of our danger, of the kind of world we live in; there must be a national
determination to maintain our freedom – to foot the bill, pay the price, whatever it is.
Next, there must be sound planning and whole-hearted cooperation by all the branches of
government involved.102
While supportive of conscription, Representative John Gwynne (R-IA) expressed concerns. For
Gwynne, “the Nation will look to Iowa for the production of a large share of its food” and “it
behooves the military not to ask for more personnel than it can use efficiently.”103
In referencing the resolution by the National Guard Association of Massachusetts,
Representative Angier Goodwin (R-MA) highlighted the strengths of the current bill and called
for this peacetime draft. According to this resolution, for Goodwin,
there is justified fully such a program in the interest and necessity of our national
security, and emphasizes the urgency of such a measure, places great responsibility on
the people and the Congress for immediate passage of such an act as the fairest, most
equitable, and most economical means of effecting our national security.104
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Representative Leonard Hall (R-NY), in referencing a speech he had made to the Nassau Chapter
Reserves Officers Association of the United States, echoed this sentiment since “civil defense
thus becomes important for the first time. Delay in planning and organizing for a war emergency
could be disastrous in a country such as ours, with its tremendous concentrations of
population.”105 Hall further explained, “the peace-loving nation has no choice except to prepare
for every type of surprise attack that might be launched against it.”106 In voicing support for
conscription, Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) said, “We must realize that the main purpose of any
foreign policy should be the freedom of the United States, and the second guiding policy should
be the maintenance of peace.”107
Representative Albert Engel (R-MI) expressed his concerns with another peacetime draft
since he felt it represented a costly expenditure to keep a sizable military force since the atomic
bomb, in his view, made large scale troop deployments obsolete for future wars.108
Representative Willis Bradley (R-CA) read a resolution by the UAW-CIO (Chrysler) opposed to
conscription that highlighted the excessive cost, their concern that American citizens “could be
used at will to completely militarize our people and place labor under direct military control,”
and their view of stronger commitment to “the United Nations to make it a real guaranty against
World War III.”109 In a similar religious argument used to object the peacetime draft in 1940,

Representative Leonard Hall, speaking on Universal Military Training and the Nation’s Security: Extension of
Remarks, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 22, 1948): HR: A1763.
106
Representative Leonard Hall, speaking on Universal Military Training and the Nation’s Security: Extension of
Remarks, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 22, 1948): HR: A1763.
107
Senator Robert Taft, speaking on Universal Military Training and National Defense: Extension of Remarks, 80th
Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (April 20, 1948): S: A2359.
108
Representative Albert Engel, speaking on Compulsory Peacetime Universal Military Conscription: Extension of
Remarks, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (March 18, 1948): HR: A1473. Despite voicing his
opposition, he ultimately vote in support of the bill.
109
Representative Willis Bradley, speaking on Universal Military Training: Extension of Remarks, 80th Cong., 2nd
sess., Congressional Record (March 18, 1948): HR: A1717. Representative Bradley voted in support of this bill.
105

68
religious sentiments were raised in 1948. In using a document written by bishops of the
Methodist Church, Representative Robert Rich (R-PA) expressed concerns of creating and
training a large standing military force. According to the concern by the bishops, they were
“unanimously committed to the cause of peace by the elimination of the causes of war and the
cultivation of international justice and good will.”110 These efforts would include the
“renunciation” of this military objective.111
Representative Parke Banta (R-MO) used a letter from a mother in his district to express
the opposition from among the American public. In this letter, Clara Hayes wrote, “these are
merely the entering wedges of a scheme totally to mobilize and regiment America’s human and
economic resources for an unlimited state of emergency and a third world war, and would end by
saddling this country with a military despotism.”112 Representative Daniel Reed (R-NY) used his
time to address the “propaganda” that had been used to bombard America’s youth to support this
military objective.113 In Reed’s view, “unless a free people refuses to be stampeded by the
impact of false propaganda, the freedom which has made this the greatest Nation on the face of
the earth will be lost.”114 Among his many concerns with this bill, Reed expressed the high cost,
the loss of resources for other aspects of the United States, the danger of insufficient rapid
training, and that research was expected to suffer if men were removed from certain positions for
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service in the military. Similar to the concerns of Reed, Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT) said,
“forced training in a field in which is not interested may deaden the zeal of the selectee quite as
much as contribute to his ultimate worth in the Army.”115
President Harry Truman issued Proclamation 2799 to address the registration process.
Much like the earlier act used in World War I and World War II, this new conscription
legislation required the self-registration of men. To make this requirement of self-registration
more explicit, section 6 (k) of the law detailed registration as a requirement for all men since “no
exception from registration, or exemption or deferment from training and service, under this title,
shall continue after the cause therefore ceases to exist.”116 Unlike the earlier uses of conscription
which limited self-registration to few specific days, the Selective Service Act of 1948 had a
much more elaborate listing of days for registration. This series of days, based upon a series of
dates in which a man was born, consisted of ten days of continued registration of men. Men
were to follow the proscribed schedule, and register themselves at their local board depending on
their date of birth. Each of these ten categories of birthdate ranges then had two separate days of
registration for men. For example, men born before September 19, 1930 should have registered
on September 17, 1948 or September 18, 1948.
Similar to the proclamations by Wilson and Roosevelt, Truman cautioned men to
familiarize themselves with the law to understand its requirements. Truman also called for
employers and state governors to assist with the ease of registration. The multiple days of
registration was intended to help ease the operation of conscription. According to this
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proclamation, if a man was unable to register due to “circumstances beyond his control” the man
was then expected to register “as soon as possible after the cause for such inability ceases to
exist.”117 Unlike the proclamations by Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, Truman’s was devoid of
any language regarding patriotism, duty, and the magnitude of importance of compliance.
Truman’s proclamation set a different tone since his proclamation was primarily a summation of
the law. Unlike the other presidents, Truman’s proclamation does not impart any personal
sentiments regarding the importance of service, building American forces, or the responsibility
of America’s men to preserve the American way of life.
The outbreak of the Korean War soon required a new solution to muster in the requisite
men needed for the war effort. Rather than use existing law, the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1951 altered some conditions of the Selective Service Act of 1948. One of the
major adjustments was the selection of men as young as 18 ½, but it also increased the length of
service from twenty-one months to twenty-four months. Men, under the amended act, were
required to serve eight years. As with earlier acts, some men were eligible for certain
deferments.
Aside from the change in age range, the Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1951 had other significant amendments. According to this act, registrants would “be
immediately liable for classification and examination” since it was essential to determine those
available for military service based on physical and mental capabilities.118 Those men that
reached the age of twenty-six would still be liable for service in the National Security Training
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Corps or the American military. This law outlined the size of each branch of the military while
noting the use of this law to maintain the strength of the American military. Presidents
maintained their authority to induct men into the military as they deemed appropriate during
times of war or peace. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Treasury also served roles
to determine what was “essential to the public and personal health” of each qualified man.119
The president, under advisement of the Secretary of Defense, was also authorized to decrease the
size of the military “in the light of international conditions” or during “a lesser period of time
than can be economically utilized.”120
This law also created the National Security Training Commission. The Commission, as it
was called in the law, consisted of three civilians and two active or retired members of the
American military. This Commission was not allowed to be dominated by one political party,
and were appointed by the president with the confirmation by the Senate. Members of the
Commission were to advise the president upon matters of training, but were also expected to
create policies and procedures for the maintenance of the American military. The Commission
was responsible for accounting for “adequate provisions for the moral and spiritual welfare” of
the military’s training, but was also required to follow the proscribed rules and regulations for
the American military.121 Upon making their decisions regarding the training procedure, the
Secretary of Defense was expected to review all recommendations to decide upon
implementation. All policy changes were then subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense.
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As with earlier laws, this law encouraged voluntary enlistment. Dating back to the
American Civil War, military officials believed the implementation of mandatory conscription
would encourage men to voluntarily enlist. While this did happen in some cases, the threat of a
conscription call did not encourage most men toward voluntary enlistment. The Korean War was
the first conflict in which the size of the military grew because of voluntary enlistment. Unlike
previous wars, the threat and fear of conscription encouraged men to enlist. One of the main
reasons for this change would be the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.
The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 shortened the length of service for reservists to six years.
The Ready Reserves could only be summoned by the president during times of national
emergency. The Congress authorized the size of the Reserve force to expand to 250,000 men,
but the Congress also restricted the authority of the president to summon the Reserves. The
Reserves could then only be summoned during periods of emergency as deemed by the
Congress. The president, however, was given more authority to fend off threats of Communism.
Amid all these changes, President Dwight Eisenhower believed military expenditures had grown
immensely, and should be halted. President Eisenhower then cut the cost of military
expenditures related to the drilling of the Reserve forces. This move, in the view of the
Congress, was dangerous since Reservist forces were based throughout the nation with little
central control or oversight because of Eisenhower’s reductions. In 1959, the Congress
responded by requiring presidents to seek Congressional approval regarding any further
reductions or restrictions upon the American military.
George Flynn (1993) and Stephen Kohn (1986) address the most significant aspects of
prosecutions. Flynn focuses on government institutions as they became the preserver of
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conscription. These institutions then fostered questioning from American society, which resulted
in resistance. This small percentage of discontented Americans were prosecuted by the
Department of Justice. In a similar study, Kohn addresses the various means of resistance
against conscription. For Kohn, evaders sought to refuse participation within a system that
required their service for a war in which they disagreed. When forced to comply and threatened
with punishment, according to Kohn, men respond negatively. Comparatively to other conflicts,
80,000 men were investigated for evasion during this time. This action by the Department of
Justice illustrates its intention to punish these acts of lawless behavior.
Vietnam War
Voluntary enlistment had reached a new height due to the Korean War. Most men
volunteered in order to select their branch of service rather than wait for selection by Selective
Service. President Truman and President Eisenhower did not issue any proclamations regarding
the American forces used for the Korean War. Nor did they issue proclamations that addressed
conscription of the United States military during this time. President John F. Kennedy increased
the size of the American military during his term in office, but did not issue proclamations
regarding conscription. On March 28, 1963, President Kennedy signed Public Law 88-2. This
law abolished the existing limit regarding the size of the armed forces, but also extended the
Selective Service System for another four years (Rothenberg 1968, 14).122 By 1964, 16,835,000
men were eligible for military conscription. Of those draft eligible, 2,000,000 were classified as
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I-A (prime for induction), 12,800,000 had other deferments or were placed in ineligible
categories (Flynn 1993, 168).123 By 1965, the size of the military increased to 2,655,000 (Flynn
1993, 170). By 1968, the number rose to 3.5 million (Flynn 1993, 170). At this point, draft
inductees increased from 16,000 to 40,000 per month. Roughly 300,000 men would be
conscripted annually until 1971 (Flynn 1993, 170-171).
On August 4, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson informed the American people that the
USS Maddox was fired upon by North Vietnamese gunboats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Americans
were told this attack was unprovoked, however, the actual sequence of events remained unclear
and uncertain. As a response, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed unanimously in the
House and passed in the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2. Despite support for military involvement
from the Congress, the anti-war movement began to grow as they focused their message against
the expansion and continued American involvement in Vietnam. Draft card burning became the
“most visible and controversial” means of draft resistance (Kohn 1986, 76). In the view of
resisters, these cards served as reminder that they were part of this system that conscripted men
for service in this ongoing and unpopular war.
Many members of Congress publicly voiced their disdain and displeasure for those that
burned their draft cards. Representative Mendel Rivers (D-SC) proposed an amendment to the
existing conscription law to explicitly prohibit and criminalize card burning. The Universal
Military Training Manual of 1951 previously contained provisions for punishments for anyone
“who forges, alters, or in any manner changes any such certificate or any notation duly and
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validly inscribed thereon.”124 The amendment altered the language to punish anyone “who
forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
certificate or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon.”125 Representative William Bray
(R-IN) said, “the need of this legislation is clear. Beatniks and so-called ‘campus cults’ have
been publicly burning their draft cards to demonstrate their contempt for the United States and
our resistance to Communist takeovers.”126 Representative Gerald Ford, years before he became
president, also voiced his support to criminalize card burning and punish card burners.
Following the escalation of involvement in the Vietnam War and as a response to
resistance against conscription, President Lyndon Johnson issued Executive Order 11391 to alter
and amend Selective Service regulations.127 This order, issued on January 24, 1967, addressed
the mailing of registration and classification documents. Registration documents, for those men
living in a military post, Canada, Mexico, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, or the Panama Canal Zone, were to be sent directly to the Director of Selective Service
rather than the closest local draft board. Johnson gave further instruction to the men living in
places other than the locations previously mentioned. Men living in these places were ordered to
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notify local board regarding where they would prefer to receive their paperwork. Once the
paperwork was completed, the registrant would then submit the paperwork within sixty days of
receiving it. Johnson also addressed matters of classification for registrants. Registrants
received their classification to their last known address, which was the address used on their
registration form and questioner. If the man lived outside the above-mentioned locations, the
Director of Selective Service was then responsible to send the classification notice. This
provision removed this task from the local boards.
As with the earlier laws, members of Congress were divided on their support of this
measure. Unlike the earlier laws under consideration, the Congress needed to grapple with the
extension and modification of conscription when used during an unpopular, undeclared war.
Representative Edward Roybal (D-CA) said,
Certainly we are united in full support of continuing our country’s vigorous search for
ways to move this tragic conflict away from the battlefield and to the conference table –
where we may have a chance to begin meaningful negotiations aimed at achieving
equitable terms for a just settlement of the war in Vietnam.128
Representative Frank Horton (R-NY) proposed changes to make conscription more equitable.
As Horton explained, “While the public, through the Congress, has the right to take some years
from the lives of healthy men for the defense of the nation, those young men have the right to
demand a fair shake from the draft…and they are not getting it now.”129 Representative Ray
Roberts (D-TX) used a letter from a draft board chairman. Clarence Roberson, Jr. wrote, “Our
board here cares not that you are rich or poor; that you are Democrat or Republican; that you are
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Jew or Gentile. We go by the book and ‘salt and pepper’ into our decisions a lot of equality and
compassion in this business of taking a young man from his home and family.”130
Representative Donald Fraser (D-MN) referenced an article printed in the Minneapolis Star.
This article did question the change to the youngest first selection, but did suggest “a system of
random selection in which everyone, and every group, will have an equal chance of being
drawn.”131
Representative Paul Fino (R-NY) suggested the drafting of “punks and hoods” since
drafting them “would cut down our ever-increasing crime rate and make our streets and parks
safe again.”132 Representative Richard Bolling (D-MO) referenced an article by Gus Tyler (the
chairman of the National Conference on the Draft). This article noted some limitations with a
professional military. “Ending the draft,” Tyler wrote, “eliminates legal compulsion to enter the
military service, but it does not eliminate circumstantial compulsion to do so. Both forms of
compulsion are disquieting to a free soul.”133 Representative Barber Conable, Jr. (R-NY)
expressed his disappointment that conscription had not received more annual reviews or
assessments by the Congress.134
Those opposed echoed the sentiments of earlier opponents. Representative George
Brown, Jr. (D-CA) emphasized the need to increase pay as a way to encourage voluntary
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enlistment. According to Brown, “The possibility of replacing the present system of compulsory
military conscription with an all volunteer [sic] professional army deserves our most serious
consideration.”135 Representative Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL), the architect for the All-Volunteer
Force, expressed his concerns with conscription that bore similarities to those concerns
expressed by Brown. Rumsfeld, in referencing an article written by Representative Thomas
Curtis (R-MO) for Playboy, listed five main issues with conscription. Men were reluctant to
serve when considering other job prospects, men did not remain in the military long enough to
become officers, the current system was economically wasteful, and the National Guard units
were excessively large.136 Representative Thomas Rees (D-CA) expressed his concern with
certain provisions in the existing bill. According to Rees, “a greater problem of morality and
conscience, is the overriding question of whose names are left out of the hat in the first place.”137
Much like earlier concerns from the religious communities, Representative Don Edwards (DCA) expressed his concerns regarding the provisions upon conscientious objectors. In the view
of Representative Edwards, “I call attention particularly to the inequity of the pending legislation
in not recognizing moral and religious obligations of Christians to abstain from participating in a
particular unjust war.”138
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Representative Brock Adams (D-WA) offered solutions for reform and the movement
toward a volunteer military. Adams advocated for improvement of boards to properly classify
men, reduction in cost with a smaller military based on readjusted needs to support America’s
allies, and a re-evaluation of American foreign policy.139 Representative Garner Shriver (R-KS)
said, “It is unfortunate that this law, which affects every American family, does not clearly state
the purpose of maximizing voluntary enlistments and minimizing draft calls.”140
The unpopularity of the Vietnam War increased as the war continued. In May 1967,
President Johnson spoke to the state directors of Selective Service. Director Lewis Hershey, the
national director, was also in attendance. Johnson addressed the role of the state and national
directors of Selective Service. Johnson described them as playing the “most important role in
providing all of us with an effective national service, and in effective national defense.”141 He
admitted that Selective Service had its critics, and his intention was to “improve” Selective
Service.142 Johnson said, “Selective Service, as you know, has been an essential part of our
Nation’s security system and a part of the system of security for the free world. It has been that
for more than a generation.”143 President Johnson noted, “that principle of fairness must prevail,
particularly at a time when only some are called upon – as they are today – to fight to defend our
freedom.”144 Johnson indicated the reports and studies conducted exposed the issues with
Selective Service, and his desire to “correct the inequalities in this system.”145
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These adjustments revolved around alterations at local boards, efforts to ensure
registrations understood the laws, a change to the appeal process for a registrant’s classification,
a change to the “oldest first” selection process, and “a fair and impartial random system of
selection.”146 These changes, in Johnson’s view, were imperative since “every principle of
fairness, every tenant of our democratic faith, requires us to make our institutions representative
of the people with whom they deal.”147 Part of this fairness, as Johnson indicated, revolved
around registrants’ awareness of the law. To ensure registrants knew their rights and the law,
they were ordered to receive a booklet. In an extension of transparency, registrants were to be
informed of the appeal process. Men were also given more time to make an appeal. This appeal
process expanded from ten days to thirty days. Johnson also addressed student deferments for
graduate education, which was eliminated for all except medical and dental students. Johnson,
referring to the use of graduate education as a way of “pyramiding,” indicated that “postgraduate
deferments have led to exemption from military duty.”148 For Johnson, all changes needed to be
evaluated based on cost, means of implementation, and their effectiveness to improve Selective
Service.149 These changes, in President Johnson’s view, were a way of “modernizing” Selective
Service.150 This issue of fairness remained a mark upon conscription each time it was used to
increase the size of the military. Johnson’s efforts to modify Selective Service to increase
fairness represented his attempt to eliminate resistance. As tensions escalated and involvement
increased in Vietnam, Johnson hoped these alterations would eliminate resistance.
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The End of the Draft and the All-Volunteer Force
President Richard Nixon echoed earlier sentiments in a statement to the Congress on May
13, 1969. Nixon noted the “disruptive impact” of conscription upon men and their families.151
Due to this disruption, Nixon said, “I continue to believe that under more stable world conditions
and with an armed force that is more attractive to volunteers, that ideal can be realized in
practice.”152 Nixon’s efforts, in his view, would “attract more volunteers to military service,
utilize military manpower in a more efficient way, and eliminate conscription as soon as that is
feasible.”153 This movement to the All Volunteer Force, however, was not an immediate
alternative to conscription. This was a process to shift American military policy from a system
of registration and selection into a system dependent on voluntary enlistment.
One of Nixon’s requests was for the Congress to amend Selective Service to conditions
prior to the amendments in 1967, which restricted the president’s ability to alter the call-up
procedures for registrants. President Nixon outlined six changes to improve conscription. Much
like Johnson, Nixon argued for the selection of the youngest men first. His second change, being
related to the first, addressed the period of eligibility for a man. In Nixon’s view, men should
have a smaller window of eligibility. The proposed change would place men into different
classes based on the length of time they were eligible for service. For example, once they were
eligible for twelve months – a man would be placed into a new category with Selective Service
to decrease the likelihood he would be called for service. Nixon explained this would reduce the
anxiety men felt because men would be equally eligible for service for a period of seven years if
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the law remained unchanged. His third proposed changed involved the selection process itself.
According to Nixon, “a procedure of this sort would distribute the risk of call equally – by lot –
among all who are vulnerable during a given year, rather than arbitrarily selecting those whose
birthdays happen to fall at certain times of the year or the month.”154
The last two changes, in Nixon’s proposal, would revolve around deferments for college
students. Unlike the change proposed by President Johnson, Nixon would continue deferments
for graduate students (regardless of their course of study) for the current academic year.
Allowing men to remain enrolled in college, for Nixon’s plan, allowed minimal disruption to
scholarship or funding, the passage of required examinations, and the completion of their
degrees. As Nixon explained, “I continue to believe in the wisdom of college deferments.
Permitting the diligent student to complete his college education without interruption by the draft
is a wise national investment.”155
Nixon concluded his statement with a comment on the role of conscription in American
society. Nixon said, “ultimately we should end the draft. Except for brief periods during the
Civil War and World War I, conscription was foreign to the American experience until the
1940’s.”156 Nixon is correct to comment on the American public’s response to conscription
through American history. Nixon correctly indicated that American society became accustomed
to peacetime conscription since 1948. Conscription, in Nixon’s view, should be replaced with a
volunteer force. In echoing the sentiments of fairness like Johnson, Nixon said, “let us be sure
that the operation of the Selective Service is as equitable and as responsible as we can make
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it.”157 Nixon explained, “by drafting the youngest first, by limiting the period of vulnerability,
by randomizing the selection process, and by reviewing deferment policies, we can do much to
achieve these important interim goals.”158
The following year, President Nixon issued Executive Order 11527 to amend certain
provisions of Selective Service law. Most of the changes revolved around altering the
deferments to make the language clearer on which men received the deferments. The provisions
to defer men for certain civilian occupations (college students) and agricultural occupations were
adjusted through this order. This executive order suspended the determents for allied medical
specialists. Student deferments were altered to include those enrolled in full-time instruction
toward the completion of a baccalaureate degree while enrolled in a community college, junior
college, technical school, or while working as an apprentice for a trade. These students were
required to earn a “satisfactory” score in full-time courses of study to receive this deferment.
Men were further evaluated based on their “necessary employment,” which required that men
performed worked amid a shortage of workers, their absence from this work was proven to cause
a “material loss of effectiveness in such activity,” the man was irreplaceable in his given field,
and the work was not seasonal.159 Agricultural workers, to receive the deferment, were those
men “employed in the production for market of a substantial quantity of those agricultural
commodities which are necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or
interest.”160
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This executive order also addressed dependency requirements and the physical
examination. Men were eligible for the child dependency deferment provided they “maintain
bona fide family relationship in their home with his child or children, except that this paragraph
shall not apply to any registrant who subsequently becomes a physician, dentist, or
veterinarian.”161 The physical examination, as per this executive order, was also altered. Men,
under the age of twenty-six that had not previously received a physical examination, were
examined upon request by the registrant. Local boards could accept these requests in writing,
and were required to perform the exam within sixty days of receiving the request. If men passed
the physical exam, and were deemed fit for service, they would then wait until they were
officially selected for service.
President Gerald Ford and President James Carter issued proclamations and executive
orders regarding clemency for those that violated the Selective Service laws. President Ford
issued Proclamation 4313 that addressed evaders and deserters.162 According to Ford,
In furtherance of our national commitment to justice and mercy these young Americans
should have the chance to contribute a share to the rebuilding of peace among ourselves
and with all nations. They should be allowed the opportunity to earn return to their
country, their communities, and their families, upon their agreement to a period of
alternate service in the national interest, together with an acknowledgement of their
allegiance to the country and its Constitution.163
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Ford acknowledged the seriousness of evasion and desertion, but indicated that clemency was
required for the nation to restore itself following the Vietnam War. Ford said, “reconciliation
among our people does not require that these acts be condoned. Yet, reconciliation calls for an
act of mercy to bind the Nation’s wounds and to heal the scars of divisiveness.”164
Conditions for reconciliation for evaders and deserters consisted of alternate service to
“promote the national health, safety, or interest” provided they did not have other existing
criminal charges.165 This term of service, to last twenty-four months, could not consist of a term
in the American military.166 Deserters, however, were subject to further scrutiny before they
were allowed admission into the clemency program. As Ford explained,
if a member of the armed forces has additional outstanding charges pending against him
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, his eligibility to participate in this program
may be conditioned upon, or postponed until after, final disposition of the additional
charges has been reached in accordance with law.167
Deserters were then also eligible for an undesirable discharge. Ford noted, “upon satisfactory
completion of a period of alternative service prescribed by the Military Department or
Department of Transportation, such individual will be entitled to receive, in lieu of his
undesirable discharge, a clemency discharge.”168
Through Executive Order 11803, President Ford created the Presidential Clemency
Board. This board, tasked with reviewing cases of clemency for evaders and deserters, provided
President Ford with their findings of support or denial of clemency per case. According to this
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order, “if clemency is recommended, the Board shall also recommend the form that such
clemency should take, including clemency conditioned upon a period of alternative service in the
national interest.”169 The Board gave priority to the men that had no other outstanding criminal
charges. The Board, created in September of 1974, was required to complete the survey and
make their determinations of clemency by December 31, 1976. This was the final day for the
existence of the Board. Executive Order 11804 authorized the Director of Selective Service to
“proscribe, to establish, implement, and administer the program of alternate service.”170 The
initial date to submit requests for clemency was January 31, 1975. President Ford, after being
told that many eligible men had been unaware of the clemency program, extended the date for
submission to March 1, 1975.171 Proclamation 4345 detailed this adjustment to the date of
submission, but Proclamation 4353 ultimately extended the submission deadline to March 31,
1975.
The final proclamation, issued by President Ford, eliminated registration for Selective
Service. Unlike any of his predecessors, President Ford suspended registration for Selective
Service. He, however, alluded to the potential of a periodic registration in the future.
Proclamation 4360, dated March 29, 1975, indicated that “an annual registration system, existing
procedures are being terminated and will be replaced by new procedures which will provide for
periodic registration.”172 This was Ford’s final action upon Selective Service. The active
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conscripting of men ended in 1973, but men were still legally required to register in the absence
of an active conscription call. Ford suspended registration several years after America’s last man
was drafted for military service.
Before the issuance of this proclamation, the courts addressed issues of registration.
Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766 was heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The case began in 1971. A five-count complaint was dismissed in
April 1972. In June 1973, the Court of Appeals affirmed all counts except for count III. Andrew
Rowland challenged the constitutionality of the Military Service Act since it only required males
to register. According to Rowland and his legal counsel, this male-only registration violated the
due process of law and the equal protection of law as interpreted by the Fifth Amendment. On
June 30, 1973, the Selective Service System lost their ability to draft more men, but registration
was still required for men. The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
called for three judges in the district court to render a decision on this case.173 In 1974, this court
determined that Rowland still needed to register and comply. They argued that deferments were
still available, which may allow Rowland to avoid service. Furthermore, unlike other recent
cases heard by the courts in the late 1960s, this was a case that challenged the legality and
constitutionality of Selective Service. Other cases, for example, questioned the availability or
legality of deferments for students. The legality of Selective Service was upheld as
constitutional.
With his victory in the election of 1976, President James Carter was inaugurated as the
39th president of the United States. The following day, January 21, 1977, he issued Executive
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Order 11967 to address the prosecution of men that violated Selective Service between August 4,
1964 and March 28, 1973. According to this order, “the Attorney General shall cause to be
dismissed with prejudice to the government all pending indictments for violations of the Military
Service Act.”174 The Attorney General was asked to dismiss these cases unless they involved
“acts of force or violence deemed to be so serious by the Attorney General” or cases that
involved “employees or officers of the Selective Service arising out of such employment.”175
This order contained provisions for those “precluded from reentering the United States…by
reason of having committed or apparently committed any violation of the Military Selective
Service Act.”176 In its concluding remarks, this order allowed “conditional clemency or granted
a pardon or other clemency” to eligible men as they would “receive the full measure of relief
afforded by this program if they are otherwise qualified under the terms of this Executive
Order.”177
Upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter restored registration for
Selective Service. This effort, part of Carter’s plan regarding the “strengthening [of] the Nation’s
capacity for rapid personnel mobilization in an emergency,” would allow the United States to
“maintain a strong military establishment not for aggressive purposes, but as a bulwark to be
used against aggression and war.”178 In echoing the previous presidents’ statements regarding
preparedness, Carter said, “we must be prepared for conventional conflict- and deterring such
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conflict may depend on the timely availability of our forces.”179 Carter called for the registration
of both men and women as an effort to “increase our preparedness and is a further demonstration
of our resolve as a nation.”180 Despite this language regarding the use of force, Carter stressed
that “the United States is committed to peace” since the buildup of military force would allow
the United States to “help maintain peace and to prevent conflict in the region of the Persian Gulf
and Southwest Asia.”181 Carter did not mobilize the local draft boards to their full operative
capacities. Young Americans would not be classified nor given medical exams Young
Americans would self-register, as males had done since World War I, as the resources of the
United States Postal Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration
were used for this effort. Carter said, “our military manpower policy continues to rely on
voluntary enlistment. I will continue to strengthen the All-Volunteer Force.”182
In a departure from earlier registration calls, women would be required to register for
non-combat roles. To explain his decision for female registration, Carter said, “[female
registration] is a recognition of the reality that both women and men are working members of our
society.”183 According to Carter, 150,000 women were serving in the armed services at this
time. As Carter noted, “they are performing well, and they have improved the level of skills in
every branch of the military service.”184 Carter addressed the concerns of the American public
regarding the potential drafting of women. Carter explained, “there are almost as many job
categories in the military service as there are in civilian life, and many of these categories do not

179

James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
181
James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
182
James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
183
James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
184
James Carter. 1980. Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft.
180

90
involve combat. In the All-Volunteer Force, women are successfully carrying out tasks which, in
the event of hostilities, would involve deploying them in or near combat zones.”185 Carter
expressed his goal to include registration of women as a long-term goal toward female equality.
Carter explained, “just as we are asking women to assume additional responsibilities, it is more
urgent than ever that the women in America have full and equal rights under the Constitution.
Equal obligations deserve equal rights.”186
President Carter gave some remarks regarding this new effort of registration on July 2,
1980. As Carter indicated, this effort of registration was “not to threaten war, but is to preserve
peace.”187 To further clarify his intentions, Carter said, “the registration act is not a draft; I am
not in favor of a peacetime draft. This registration act will do a great deal to marshal our own
Nation’s resistance to succumbing to temptation which might lead to war.”188 In Carter’s view,
conscription was only be used during formal declarations of war or national emergency, but
would also require “separate legal action” by the Congress. Carter wanted to remain committed
to the use of the All -Volunteer Force for defense and offensive purposes. In echoing the
sentiments of President Lincoln and President Wilson of obedience and adherence to the law,
Carter said, “I would like to ask the support of all Americans for this move: Americans in the age
that will be registered and Americans of all ages who believe in a strong country, who believe in
patriotism, who believe in maintaining peace through strength.”189
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This act, according to Carter, meant that men and women were required to register
themselves since registration would allow for “expediting the process by which, if our Nation
enters a time of emergency or a threat to our national security or a time of war in the future, the
marshalling of our defense mechanisms can be expedited.”190 The Congress allocated the funds
to cover the cost of registration, but did not implement female registration. The first round of
registration called for nineteen through twenty-one year old males, which was to begin on July
21, 1980. On July 18, 1980, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an opinion that the Military Selective Service Act violated the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.191 The United States Government filed a petition of appeal on
July 19, 1980. Justice Brennan, Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, granted a stay of the district
court’s order to suspend registration. Male registration, however, resumed on July 21, 1980.
Despite his efforts for female equality, Carter’s proposed registration of women has still not
taken place even in the current period.
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Understanding the Data
Table 1 demonstrates the support among the members of Congress regarding each of the
conscription laws. The debates among members of Congress, either supportive or opposed to
conscription, remained similar over time. Congress, as shown in Table 2, did not vote along
party lines since this shows broader support for conscription as a military policy.
Table 1: Congressional Voting Pattern
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Table 2:Presidential Congressional Support
Congress
37
65
76
80
90

Presidential
Party
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

Presidential Party
in U.S. House
108
214
262
188
248

Presidential Party
in U.S. Senate
31
54
69
54
64

Proportion of Presidential
Party in U.S. Congress
0.5991
0.5047
0.6233
0.4557
0.5831

The party of the sitting president maintained a majority in the 37th, 65th, 76th, and 80th
sessions of the Congress. This illustrates the times of unified government. While conscription
was not a partisan issue, we can examine the overall number of seats held by the president’s
party as each conscription bill was voted upon in the Congress.
The usage of conscription during various wars remained largely contested among the
American public. Despite these challenges, the Congress continued to implement pieces of
legislation to require the registration and mandatory service of young men. This military service,
during declared and undeclared wars, was deemed essential by different sessions of Congress
then signed into law by the president. Members of Congress had remained vocal in their support
of or opposition against conscription. Many of their arguments, either positive or negative,
remained consistent throughout American history. These arguments of support inform many of
the statements made by the presidents. National defense, national security, and obligations of
citizenship remained constant themes to support conscription. Those opposed echoed the
sentiments of personal liberty, the benefits of volunteerism, and the flaws within conscription.
While there have been some noticeably silent presidents, most have been vocal in their support
of conscription. Most presidents have made statements to encourage compliance, emphasized
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punishments for disobedience, and have even expressed their concerns with alteration and
fairness.

CONCLUSION
Between 1863 and 1973, America’s male population was subject to conscription calls and
mandatory military service. Conscription was used to quickly amass a large military force.
Congress debated and voted favorably on these conscription bills. Several presidents then issued
their remarks regarding the bills. These proclamations and executive orders illustrate the actions
and role of the American president. The American president, the commander in chief of the
armed forces of the United States, was further tasked with enforcement of these laws. These
proclamations and executive orders differed per president, and some presidents remained silent
upon the issue of conscription. These leaders made statements regarding compliance, potential
punishments, and their efforts to improve conscription. While conscription remained a relatively
unpopular policy throughout American history, these presidents sought to elicit compliance and
adherence of law. Once the conscription ended in 1973, President Ford and President Carter
offered plans for clemency for violators. Overall, these presidents have been vocal regarding the
importance of conscription, the need for a large military force, and the responsibilities of the
American military force either domestically or internationally.
Conscription is an interesting case study to examine amid the theories of critical juncture,
path dependency, power of the president, unilateral action, and the Two Presidencies Thesis. In
a departure with the militia system, the implementation of federal conscription signifies a critical
juncture. In creating this new system, Congress passed legislation to directly conscript men into
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the United States military. The theories of unilateral action should not be broadly used to
explain the actions of all presidents at the time of an active draft.
Conscription, used to create a federally maintained and controlled military policy, was
used to quickly muster and maintain a large military. While conscription remained an unpopular
military policy, the presidents sought to instill order, elicit obedience and adherence to the law,
and calm the criticism from its opponents. As the head of the executive branch and the
commander in chief of the American military, these presidents have shown their support for
conscription by signing conscription bills into law. Even as President Johnson and President
Nixon addressed deferments and their efforts to increase fairness, these presidents worked with
the existing law.
Some presidents were more active in their relationship with conscription. President
Eisenhower called for the end to funding for the Reserves, but Congress pushed back
legislatively to restrict the president from funding decisions regarding the Reserves. President
Nixon was vocal opponents to conscription as he called for an alternative system, but ultimately
asked for the Congress to extend the then current conscription law for an additional two years.
President Ford officially ended registration, but also created a system of clemency. President
Carter responded to the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan as he called for Congress to restore
registration for men and women. In a response to Carter, the Congress only appropriated funds
for the registration of men. Historically, presidents waited for the actions of Congress. In more
recent times, however, some presidents took a more active role in their relationship with the
Congress in regard to conscription. There are, however, few instances in which presidents took
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unilateral action in regard to conscription. Presidents have followed the action of Congress to
draft and pass bills regarding conscription. The Two Presidencies Thesis has been used to
explain the deference of Congress to presidents in matters of foreign policy, but conscription
remains an example of Congress leading the action. While there are some noted exceptions
(such as President Richard Nixon, President Gerald Ford, and President James Carter), presidents
have mostly followed Congress rather than take an outward stance regarding conscription.
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